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1. INTRODUCTION 
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is perhaps best known for his cultural sociology. 
Bourdieu is often referred to in discussions about taste and social class and Bourdieu´s 
most famous work Distinction (La Distinction) concerns the relationship between taste 
distinctions and class distinctions1. In common academic parlance “The Bourdieusian 
approach” means questioning claims to objectivity when it comes to cultural taste. 
In addition to his cultural sociology, Bourdieu developed a general research framework 
called “praxeology”. It is a practice-oriented approach that applies to social phenomena. 
Bourdieu´s famous concepts habitus, social field (champs sociale), symbolic capital 
(capital symbolique), illusio, and skholé are all parts of the framework. Bourdieu kept 
developing his approach throughout his career, attempting to build a solid theory. He 
left a scholarly legacy that reaches wide across different academic disciplines from 
sociology to anthropology, comparative religion and philosophy. 
While developing a theoretical framework to ground his empirical studies, Bourdieu 
also created a social ontology. He offers an account of the social world that 
characterizes its entities, their relations and their genesis in social practices. Bourdieu 
establishes universals within the social world: all human societies are social fields with 
positions.  
Bourdieu trained originally as a philosopher but later became a self-taught 
anthropologist and sociologist. His thought has been influenced by both sociology and 
philosophy. While such prominent sociologists as Émile Durkheim and Max Weber are 
important to Bourdieu, many philosophers from both Anglo-American and continental 
traditions are central influences as well.  
Bourdieu was always careful not to call himself a philosopher. He wanted to be seen as 
a sociologist, who deals with questions that philosophers do not ask. He saw the 
importance of taking empirical evidence into account and had little respect for armchair 
philosophy. However, much of what Bourdieu has written could be well classified as 
philosophy. Perhaps the best way of describing Bourdieu in relation to philosophy 
1 D 
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would then be his own description of Wittgenstein as one of the “thinkers who are close 
to being seen by philosophers as enemies of philosophy, because, like Wittgenstein, 
they make its prime task dispelling of illusions, especially those that the philosophical 
tradition produces and reproduces”2. 
This thesis is an examination of the relationship between the German philosopher 
Martin Heidegger´s early thought and Bourdieu´s social ontology. I argue in the thesis 
that the social ontology that Bourdieu builds is influenced by Heidegger´s early 
philosophy. On the other hand, the two thinkers also differ in many ways. Bourdieu has 
been influenced by the early Heidegger, but takes the Heideggerian project into a 
direction of his own.  Bourdieu builds on the Heideggerian fundamental ontology but 
focuses his study on the empirical world. Bourdieu´s central concepts differ from the 
Heideggerian conceptual frame but can be to some extent traced back to it.  
Seen through the Heideggerian conceptual framework, Bourdieu´s sociology is not only  
ontical collecting of material evidence or not even a regional ontology. His conceptual 
framework accounts for the conditions of the possibility of experience, science and in 
fact, social reality. Bourdieu tries to philosophically grasp the relations between social 
fields and habitus´ and empirically study how these relations play out in concrete social 
contexts. Thus his project can be analytically divided into three realms: the 
“fundamental ontological” (temporal social practice as the unfolding of the real, see 
chapter 5 for details), the socio-ontological (mapping out of entities, i.e. the field, 
capitals, and positions) and the empirical (concrete empirical studies of different fields 
and their structure. This thesis concerns all of these realms, but the “fundamental 
ontological” shall be examined the most. 
The central problematic of this thesis can be divided in three questions: 
 1)What are the philosophical similarities between Bourdieu and early 
 Heidegger? 
 2) What are the differences between them? 
 3) How is Bourdieu´s social ontology complementary in relation to 
 Heidegger? 
2 PM, 1 
2 
 
                                                          
I initially decided to write this thesis when I found an important similarity between 
Bourdieu and Heidegger: The concepts Dasein and world3 have a similar structural role 
in Heidegger´s thought as habitus and the social field have in Bourdieu´s. Bourdieu 
discusses the relationship between these concepts in a rarely cited interview for the 
Japanese periodical iichiko intercultural. The following passage in the interview is 
central to the argumentation of my thesis: 
 [Tetsuji Yamamoto:] In other words, you replace the relation between 
 Dasein and Welt in Heideggerian phenomenology with the relation 
 between habitus and field? 
 Bourdieu: Yes, but this relationship of ontological complicity called forth 
 by the later Heidegger establishes itself between two “realities”, habitus 
 and field, that are two modes of the existence of history, or society, history 
 as thing, objectified institution and embodied history. Thus a theory of 
 time can be formed that breaks with two opposed philosophies of 
 temporality: on the one hand, a metaphysical vision that makes time a 
 reality in itself, independent, according to the metaphor of flux, of agents, 
 their representations and actions; on the other, a philosophy of conscience: 
 far from being an a priori and transcendental condition of historicity, time 
 is what the practical activity produces in the very act of its self-
 production.4 
Bourdieu thus admits that his conceptual pair can be seen as a modification of the 
Heideggerian one5. The role of the pair is to provide a general ontological structure for 
human being that gets filled out differently in different historical and social situations. 
Habitus and field together can be seen as two aspects of the same coin:  they are aspects 
of the background of intelligibility on the basis of which things show up. For Bourdieu, 
individual knowledge is only possible insofar as there is a social world that structures 
experience. According to Bourdieu, this social, historical world can be studied by social 
science and the knowledge that the study yields is objectively valid. Bourdieu´s interest 
in the empirical is a difference in focus between him and Heidegger. 
3 Whenever the concept world is used in the Heideggerian sense, it will be written in italics. 
4 EPTH, 11 (Translation: V.L.) 
5 EPTH, 11-13 
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Bourdieu claims to be a radical historicist and criticizes the Heideggerian existentalia 
for being ahistorical and caught up in the notion of the transcendental subject6. 
Bourdieu thinks that the empirical social sciences can bring out different types of 
habitus and fields with different structures. According to Bourdieu, Heideggerian 
fundamental ontology´s attempt to bring out universal structures of Dasein´s way of 
being is bound to fail. 
I shall examine the central tension between the historical and ahistorical in Bourdieu. 
On the one hand he emphasizes his historicist position and on the other he creates 
concepts that claim to be universal. This leads Bourdieu into philosophical problems 
that potentially jeopardize the relevance of his empirical findings. He seems unjustified 
in criticizing Heidegger for transcendentalism and ahistoricality, when he at the same 
time gives his own conceptual framework a universal validity (see e.g. Bourdieu on 
fields7). 
The Bourdieusian social field has a similar function but a different structure compared 
to the Heideggerian world: The social field consists of positions that are connected to 
different forms of symbolic capital. The Heideggerian account of worldhood then again 
does not take account of social positions. The role of the social is not as apparent in the 
Heideggerian ontology as it is in Bourdieu 
Bourdieu´s interpretation of the social world lacks the Heideggerian emphasis on 
authenticity. Heidegger claims that the public world offers an inauthentic understanding 
of being that Dasein can seek to overcome. For Bourdieu, common interpretations are 
not so much inauthentic as oppressive: individuals are not held responsible for their 
authenticity. It is the task of the social scientist to bring out this oppression.  Bourdieu´s 
concept of symbolic capital has also been interpreted to provide a specific interpretation 
of human being as interest-driven accumulation of different capitals, which is alien to 
Heideggerian ontology8.  
I will focus on the Heideggerian themes that are most present in Bourdieu´s social 
ontology: Heidegger´s phenomenology of world and everydayness and its relation to 
6 EPTH, 8 
7 SQ, 72 
8 Dreyfus & Rabinow 1993 
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human beings. Therefore I shall mostly cite Division I of Heidegger´s magnum opus 
Being and Time. I have chosen Being and Time as my main source also because it is the 
most explicit source of Heidegger´s phenomenology of our everyday dealings with 
things.  
 
Being and Time is from the period preceding Heidegger´s switch to a less human-
centred way of thinking about being in the 1930s 9 . The phenomenology of 
everydayness (Dasein´s existential analytic) is Heidegger´s way of approaching the 
general structure of human experience, the existentialia10. Ultimately he aims at 
discovering the meaning of being (Sinn von Sein), the temporal horizon on the basis of 
which intelligibility is possible.  
 
Being and Time is the book that acquainted Pierre Bourdieu with Heidegger´s thought. 
It thus forms the most relevant connection between the two thinkers. Bourdieu admits 
that Heidegger, among others, helped him with his “efforts to analyse the ordinary 
experience of the social”.11  
Bourdieu was unimpressed by Being and Time´s account of anxiety, guilt and 
authenticity. He was more inspired by Heidegger´s account of a shared world as a basis 
of experiencing reality. Bourdieu describes Heidegger´s account of authenticity and 
levelling down of values as a “completely false philosophy of action and a conservative 
vision of the social world”12 and states that he “never really got into the existentialist 
mood”13. 
My way of interpretation of Heidegger owes much to Hubert Dreyfus. His extensive 
lecturing and many articles on Heidegger form a uniform interpretation of Heidegger´s 
philosophy with a particular focus on the phenomenology of skill in early Heidegger. 
Dreyfus emphasises the phenomenology everydayness in early Heidegger and that is 
also the main focus of my reading of Being and Time. 
9 See, for example, Moran 2000, 208-209 
10 “Existentialia” is the plural of the noun “existentiale”. 
11 IOW, 5 
12 PR, 24 
13 IOW, 5 
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On Bourdieu´s part I shall be looking at several works that have been published at 
different stages of his career. The influence of Heidegger can be found throughout 
Bourdieu´s vast corpus.  Bourdieu aimed at creating a coherent theoretical framework 
and used the same concepts throughout his career.  
 
1.1. Central concepts 
Much of Heidegger´s and Bourdieu´s special terminology is used in this thesis. These 
terms will mostly be defined as they are discussed in the text. I shall define only the 
most central ones here, namely Dasein, world, habitus, social field and symbolic 
capital. The other most central concepts that require clarifying are social ontology, 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, the humanities, the social sciences and practice. 
Dasein 
The term Dasein is an everyday word in German signifying existence, but for 
Heidegger its signification is derived from a breaking down of the term into two parts, 
“Da” and “Sein”. Da signifies there or here and Sein signifies being, so the term can be 
roughly translated as “being-there”, which entails a cultural and spatial situatedness of 
human beings. This is the opposite of the ideal of the “view from nowhere”, which 
entails an abstract, atemporal and aspatial, acultural way of grasping things.  The 
processuality, or temporality, of Dasein is important in relation to the tradition of the 
transcendental subject. Dasein is not static and outside time, but inside time and 
understands its possibilities in terms of time, based on the past and oriented towards the 
future. Dasein is always ahead of itself, as it projects itself in the future through its 
possibilities.  
Dasein is Heidegger´s name for the being that interprets itself through its 
actions. Dasein is a process, an activity that14 has cultural conditions of possibility and 
14 Dreyfus 1991, 95 
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has to do with a way of being peculiar to human beings. Like Bourdieu´s habitus it has 
very little essential content, only a general structural outline. 15  
The world (Welt) 
Heidegger´s concept of world refers to the shared background of intelligibility that 
envelops to Dasein. Dreyfus describes the world as an umbrella concept, under which 
different sub-worlds belong.16  
The world is to be understood as that on the basis of which we have an understanding of 
beings. When we encounter anything at all that is intelligible and thus recognisable, it is 
encountered on the basis of the world as a background. The world structures our 
experiences of entities: “[A present-at-hand] entity can 'meet up with' Dasein only in so 
far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world.”17 
The world has a structure: entities are encountered in it as either Dasein, ready-to-hand 
or present-at-hand and things are done according to a pattern of in-order-tos, towards-
whiches and for-the-sake-of-whiches. This structure is called the worldhood of the 
world.  
Habitus 
Bourdieu defines habitus as a durable system of dispositions that generates practices 
and representations:  
 The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of 
 existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, 
 structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that 
 is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations 
 that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a 
 conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
 necessary to attain them. Objectively "regulated” and "regular” without in 
 any way being the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively 
15 BT, 67-68 
16 Dreyfus 1991, 90-91 
17 BT, 84 
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 orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a 
 conductor.18 
People act and experience things on the basis of their habitus. Bourdieu also stresses 
that meaningful acting in the social world does not need to be oriented towards 
conscious goals or based on following any rules. Thus it may seem like people make 
individual and free choices when their action is actually socially “orchestrated”.  
Habitus is Bourdieu´s way of combining and overcoming what he calls “objectivism” 
and “subjectivism”. He takes into use a practice-oriented term that can account for both 
of these aspects of the social without reducing them to one another. Habitus is a 
subjective experience, bodily disposition and compliance with objective structures at the 
same time. 
The literal signification of habitus, “habituated”, gives a hint of the way it should be 
understood: for Bourdieu being human is ultimately different customs that are socially 
acquired and that have a connection to power relations.  
 
Social field 
The social field is an aggregate of separate subfields. Fields consist of positions that 
individuals with different amounts of social capital attempt to attain. Fields go through 
historical change and their structures of positions and capitals vary. Bourdieu defines 
fields as structured spaces: 
 Fields present themselves synchronically as structured spaces of positions 
 (or posts) whose properties depend on their position within these spaces 
 and which can be analysed independently of the characteristics of their 
 occupants (which are partly determined by them). There are general laws 
 of fields: fields as different as the field of politics, the field of philosophy 
 or the field of religion have invariant laws of functioning.19 
18 LP, 53 
19 SQ, 72. 
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The field is the objective side of Bourdieu´s theory, whereas the representations that 
habitus generates are the subjective. All individuals act on shared fields and fields are 
the source of significance and representations for individuals. Fields have general laws, 
so their general characteristics are universal.20 
Symbolic capital 
Symbolic capital is the incentive that makes people participate in the social sphere in 
Bourdieu´s theory. Bourdieu refers to agency within social fields as a game with stakes. 
Symbolic capital in its different forms is the stake that players are after. Symbolic 
capital exists to explain the fact that people seem to act towards goals that cannot be 
directly linked with financial gain. Bourdieu wants to say that people have other 
interests that they actively pursue, other capitals than just the financial and that these 
other capitals are also linked to positions in a given society. 
 Every kind of capital (economic, cultural, social) tends (to 
 different degrees) to function as symbolic capital (so that it might be better 
 to speak, in rigorous terms, of the symbolic effects of capital) when it 
 obtains an explicit or practical recognition, that of a habitus structured 
 according to the very structures of the space in which it has been 
 engendered.21 
Cultural and social capital are added next to the economic, the only one traditionally 
accounted for. Bourdieu adds that capitals are not symbolic as such, but acquire the 
status of symbols once they are taken to represent power, which means that they have 
symbolic effects. They only have this effect when they are socially recognized as forms 
of capital.  
The power structure in a society is based on a “generative principle”, namely that of the 
distribution of capital. Bourdieu´s addition to the traditional analysis of capital (which 
for Marx divides society into two fundamental classes, the capitalists and the 
proletariat) is taking into account other forms of capital that cannot be reduced to 
20 SQ, 72. 
21 PM, 242 
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economic capital. Bourdieu thinks that different forms of capital can be converted to 
each other but that the forms still work in specific ways. 
 
Social ontology 
 
Ontology can be defined as an inquiry concerning the fundamental character of being 
and reality. Ontology in the standard use of the term entails providing a description of 
possible entities and relations between those entities.22 The term social ontology denotes 
a special case of ontology that pertains to human communities. It aims to bring out the 
character of the social world, its entities and their relations.  
Heidegger´s fundamental ontology aims at providing a basis for ontologies that the 
sciences, again, have as their basis. Fundamental ontology studies the question of 
intelligibility in general, the fact that we experience entities. Special sciences have their 
regional ontologies, ontologies that map the entities and their relations within the realm 
of that science.23 Thus social ontology (as the basis of the ontical science of 
sociology24) needs fundamental ontology as its basis25. Bourdieu´s social ontology, 
albeit discussing the social world, is not only a regional ontology. It rather discusses 
intelligibility in the manner of fundamental ontology and roots the showing up of 
entities to the social world.  
Phenomenology 
Phenomenology is a philosophical movement epitomized by the German Edmund 
Husserl according to which philosophy needs to be established as a rigorous science by 
returning to the “things themselves”26. Husserl aimed to do this by carrying out 
something he calls a “phenomenological reduction” that consists of bracketing out 
everything from our scope except that which is immediately present to consciousness27. 
22 Definition from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Hofweber 2011) 
23 Aho 2009, 17 
24 The dichotomy ontical/ontological refers to two different levels of description: the ontic level is the 
level of beings and the ontological level that of ways of being. The ontological level makes the ontic level 
intelligible.   
25 BT, 31 
26 Husserl 1965, 71-72 
27 Husserl 1999, 34 
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What is present is in Husserl´s terminology a pure phenomenon, the study of which, a 
logos, is phenomenology. Phenomenology studies experience and specifically 
Husserlian phenomenology is preoccupied with studying the intentional structure of 
consciousness, the way in which human beings relate to the outside world. 
Husserl did not invent phenomenology as such but rather took up the tradition passed on 
by such thinkers as Franz Brentano, Wilhelm Dilthey and Carl Stumpf. It was Husserl, 
though, who made phenomenology into a movement with a research program. Husserl 
insisted that philosophy is a rigorous science that is able to solve epistemological 
confusions within the realm of the “positive sciences” that do not worry about their 
access to objectivity.28 Husserl refers to the epistemological nonchalance of the positive 
sciences as the “natural attitude” which the wants to contrast with the “philosophical 
attitude” of phenomenology29.  
Heidegger´s understanding of phenomenology is related to Husserl but departs from it 
in its attempt to overcome the Cartesian subject-object –division with the notion of the 
interpretative essence of human beings. Heidegger also gave up on Husserl´s model of 
intentionality due to its cognitivist emphasis. Heidegger´s and Bourdieu´s definitions of 
phenomenology shall be discussed later in the thesis. 
Hermeneutics 
Hermeneutics is a discipline that deals with interpretation and has roots in theology, 
literary studies, jurisprudence and greek philosophy. Hermeneutics gained a more 
eminent position in secular philosophy as its task was widened to questions of 
interpretation in general by such thinkers as Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm 
Dilthey.  
A further revolution of hermeneutics occurred along with the emergence of Heidegger´s 
peculiar combination of phenomenology and hermeneutics and his account of human 
being as constant self- and other-interpreting activity. Hermeneutics becomes ontology, 
because, for Heidegger, interpretation is reality manifesting itself. There is no reality 
that is not interpreted, thus only the temporal/izing activity of Dasein provides humans 
28 Husserl 1999, 26 
29 Husserl 1999, 19 
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access to reality. Dasein´s understanding has a fore-structure (Vorstruktur) which must 
be taken into account in order to understand being. In other words, an account of 
Dasein´s interpretative way of being is the pre-condition of ontology in the broadest 
sense. Dasein´s facticity means that things are never encountered as such, but are 
always encountered as already interpreted.  
The humanities and the social sciences 
The term humanities refers to the German concept of Diltheyan Geisteswissenschaften, 
study of the spirit (spirit here referring not only to a transcendent realm but more 
broadly to thought). The humanities study culture in the broad sense: human 
institutions, objects et cetera. This field of research differs from natural science and 
somewhat also from social science. The idea behind this demarcation is that different 
points-of-view and different objects of research merit different methods. Thus, a line 
can be drawn between the natural sciences seeking laws and abstract principles behind 
the phenomena they study through repeatable experimental situations, and the 
humanities that describe the phenomena they study through interpretation.  
The perhaps main differentiating principle between the humanities and the natural 
sciences for the German idealistic tradition would be that the humanities study things in 
relation to their meaningful constitution, not as they appear independent of 
consciousness30. From the Diltheyan perspective, meanings reside only in our 
experience and thus aren´t the object of the natural sciences31.   
Bourdieu defines his work as social science and sets himself apart from mere 
interpretative study by claiming to reach objective results. The social sciences do not 
have a clear position in relation to the humanities and also Bourdieu´s own view on the 
relationship between his own research, the humanities and the social sciences in unclear.  
Practice 
The concept of practice is first introduced in Aristotle and his notion of praxis. Praxis 
concerns action and is thus differentiated from that which could not be otherwise 
30 Tool 2007, 12 
31 Varto 2005, 43 
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(theoria) and making things (poiesis). Practical wisdom is a capacity to act in an 
appropriate way.32 
The concept of practice invoked in this thesis is related to a reconceiving of the role of 
practice in human action in contrast to conscious activity. Heidegger and Bourdieu both 
have a conception of practice that relates back to this shifting of the role of praxis in 
understanding human action. Praxis as goal-oriented action defined by structures is 
modified into pratique: responding to situations by having a sense of what is relevant33. 
They both view practice as a framework in terms of which human being is best grasped 
and described. Charles Taylor expresses this as follows: 
Of course, no one has failed to notice that human beings act. The crucial 
difference is that these philosophers [Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and 
Wittgenstein] set the primary locus of the agent´s understanding in 
practice. – To situate our understanding in practices is to see it as implicit 
in our activity, and hence as going well beyond what we manage to frame 
representations of – [M]uch of our intelligent action in the world, sensitive 
as it usually is to our situation and goals, is carried on unformulated, it 
flows from an understanding which is largely inaccurate. -- Seeing that our 
understanding resides first of all in our practices involves attributing an 
inescapable role to the background. – [The habitus] is one of the key terms 
necessary to give an account of the background understanding invoked in 
the previous section.34  
Taylor describes practice as vaguely normative. Practices are not strictly rule-governed 
behaviour but responding appropriately to a shared situation. Acting is socially directed 
towards common goals:  
Even in an area where there are no clearly defined rules, there are 
distinctions between different sorts of behavior such that one sort is 
considered the appropriate form for one action or context, the other for 
another action or context; e.g., doing or saying certain things amounts to 
32 Aristotle 2009, 106 
33 Yamamoto 1989, 20-21 
34 Taylor 2000, 33-34 
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breaking off negotiations, doing or saying other things amounts to making 
a new offer.35 
 
1.2. Central sources 
From Bourdieu I will mostly be citing his theoretical writings published throughout his 
career. The most important ones are the theoretical works Outline of a theory of practice 
(Esquisse d´un théorie de a pratique), Sociology in Question, An Invitation to Reflexive 
Sociology and the later philosophical work Pascalian Meditations (Méditations 
pascaliennes). In Heidegger my attention will mainly be focused on Being and Time 
(Sein und Zeit) and additionally the lecture courses preceding the publication of Being 
and Time: The History of the concept of Time (Prolegomena zur Geschichte des 
Zeitbegriffs).36 
My important secondary sources include Hubert Dreyfus´s Being-In-The-World – A 
commentary on Being and Time Division I  and many other treatises and articles on my 
topic, of which should be mentioned Hubert Dreyfus´s and Paul Rabinow´s (1993) “Can 
There Be a Science of Existential Structure and Social Meaning”, Charles Taylor´s 
(1971) “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man” and Frédéric Vandenberghe´s  (1999) ” 
“The Real is Relational”: An Epistemological Analysis of Pierre Bourdieu’s Generative 
Structuralism “. All these and many other cited texts have helped to bring out the 
similarities between Bourdieu and Heidegger and bridging conceptual gaps.  
 
1.3. The structure of the thesis 
This chapter (chapter one) and the next chapter (chapter two) are introductory chapters. 
The three central questions that the thesis attempts to answer shall be approached as 
follows:  The similarities between Heidegger and Bourdieu (question one) are discussed 
35 Taylor 1971, 25 
36 I have gone through all my primary sources in their original language but will cite the works in English 
and note possible modifications of the translation in footnotes. On Heidegger´s part I am more dependent 
on translations as my feel for the German language is not sufficient for working out all the important 
connotations of his terminology. 
14 
 
                                                          
primarily in chapter three and the differences (question two) primarily in chapters four 
and five. The complementary role that Bourdieu´s thought has in relation to Heidegger 
(question three) comes out throughout the thesis.   
After this first chapter (chapter one) I shall go through previous research on the 
relationship between Bourdieu and Heidegger in chapter two. I shall also go through 
some of the central traits of the two thinkers and introduce the problematic of 
comparing them. In chapters three, four and five I shall present different aspects of 
Heidegger´s and Bourdieu´s thought. I discuss one theme per chapter and compare the 
thinkers´ views on it. I have chosen the themes to emphasize views that Heidegger and 
Bourdieu share and, on the other hand, relevant questions where they differ. I am using 
Heideggerian ontology as a way of mapping Bourdieu´s sometimes scattered thoughts 
onto a worked out social ontology. 
 In chapter three I introduce Heidegger´s and Bourdieu´s views on the interplay between 
human beings and the shared world. I compare the conceptual pairs of Dasein – world 
and habitus – social field and show how they are connected. The connection between 
the pairs of concepts is the similar relation they have in Bourdieu´s and Heidegger´s 
ontologies. In chapter four I move on to discuss the relation between hermeneutics, 
phenomenology and science in Bourdieu. I show that Bourdieu and Heidegger have 
different concerns with science and objectivity: Bourdieu approaches the problematic in 
terms of fields and reflexivity, early Heidegger only on the basis of fundamental 
ontology. In the final main chapter, chapter five, I compare Bourdieu´s and Heidegger´s 
accounts of temporality, practice and the social. I show that there is a significant 
similarity between their accounts but Bourdieu´s historicism leads him away from 
Heidegger. 
After these chapters I draw some conclusions in chapter six and present the findings of 
the thesis in a concise form. I also attempt to map some questions that might be 
important to raise concerning this topic in future research.  
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2. THE UNEXAMINED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOURDIEU AND 
HEIDEGGER  
2.1 Previous scholarship on Heidegger´s and Bourdieu´s philosophical relationship 
and the relevance of comparing the two thinkers 
The relationship between Pierre Bourdieu and Heidegger has not been thoroughly 
examined even though it offers important insight into Bourdieu´s research program. 
Bourdieu has been influenced by many key thinkers in 20th century social philosophy 
such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Yet the 
relationship between his and Heidegger´s thought has been left uncovered. 
My method of inquiry is a close-reading and comparison of  Bourdieu´s and early 
Heidegger´s key texts. The difficulty with comparing Bourdieu and Heidegger with 
each other is that their terminologies do not match in many ways. Some of Bourdieu´s 
terms (body hexis, doxa, skholè), although close to Heidegger´s philosophy, do not have 
immediate counterparts and vice versa. 
A probable reason for the neglect of Bourdieu´s Heideggerian roots in scholarship is 
that Bourdieu has stayed on the outskirts of philosophy by defining his work as 
sociology. Bourdieu at times even intentionally undermined the positive influence of 
Heidegger´s thought on his methodological understanding. Jeremy F. Lane points out 
that Bourdieu omitted some references to Heidegger from the English translation of his 
early book Outline of a Theory of Practice, possibly due to the recent publishing of his 
first critical texts on Heidegger37.  
Another reason for the lack of research on the relationship between Bourdieu and 
Heidegger might be that Bourdieu during the years of his education was more directly 
in contact with Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty´s thought could be seen a more 
relevant and temporally proximate context for an account of Bourdieu´s philosophical 
influences. Although the relationship between Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty is 
important, it does not undermine the relevance of Bourdieu´s relationship with 
Heidegger. Bourdieu read Heidegger at an early stage of his academic career and has 
37 Lane 2000, 112. (Lane is probably referring to the publishing of a version of The Political Ontology of 
Martin Heidegger as an article in the academic journal launched by Bourdieu, Actes de la recherche en 
sciences sociales.) 
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acknowledged Heidegger´s influence on his thought and, according to Hubert Dreyfus, 
admitted that Heidegger was his first love in philosophy38.  
Bourdieu is a skilled writer and an eminent intellectual figure. Throughout his work and 
especially in Pascalian Meditations Bourdieu keenly discusses philosophers and relates 
his work to different philosophical schools and problems. It is thus a challenging 
prospect to examine Bourdieu´s relationship to Heidegger “behind Bourdieu´s back” so 
to say. However, detailed description of the Heideggerian influences in Bourdieu´s 
thought can shed light on the philosophical background of the concepts of habitus and 
the social field. It will also clarify the ontological basis of the vast research that has 
been carried out in the 20th and 21st centuries with the help of this conceptual 
framework. 
There is an extensive amount of literature on both Bourdieu and Heidegger but very few 
texts discuss them together. Heidegger has been written about both within philosophy 
and, due to his entanglement with Nazism, sociologically and historically. Literature on 
Bourdieu is mostly sociological. There is very little scholarship on the positive role of 
Heidegger in Bourdieu´s thought.  
Bourdieu himself briefly references Heidegger every now and then throughout his work, 
increasingly favourably towards the end of his career. In his late work, Pascalian 
Meditations (245 pages in the English edition), for example, there are 23 separate 
Heidegger references whereas in the earlier The Logic of Practice (283 pages in the 
English edition) there are only six. Bourdieu has also published a study on Heidegger, 
The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, in which he writes about Heidegger with a 
critical tone and argues that Heidegger´s “purely philosophical” works have similar 
political implications as his infamous Rectoral address, for instance39.   
Bourdieu´s own version of his philosophical relationship with Heidegger is not a 
sufficiently impartial account. There are some articles by others on Bourdieu and 
Heidegger, such as Herman Philipse´s “Questions of Method: Bourdieu and Heidegger” 
where he discusses Bourdieu´s views about Heidegger´s reception in different cultural 
38 Kreisler 2005 
39 PO, 101 & SGU.  In his speech held on the occasion of his appointment as rector of the University of 
Freiburg, “The Self-Assertion of the German University” Heidegger speaks about the “spiritual mission 
of the German people” and encourages the student body´s servitude to the new regime (SGU, 8).  
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contexts. Philipse´s article is a typical example of authors commenting on Bourdieu´s 
critique of Heidegger´s philosophy without commenting on the positive role of 
Heideggerian ontology in Bourdieu´s thought.40  
Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow address the positive relationship of Bourdieu and 
Heidegger in the article “Could There Be a Science of Existential Structure and 
Meaning?”. They see Bourdieu as a Heideggerian social scientist but argue, that 
Bourdieu´s social ontology runs into trouble. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
Bourdieu´s stressing of the scientific, objective nature of his inquiry is problematic 
because he makes a metaphysical claims about human nature with his theory of 
symbolic capital.41 
According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, Bourdieu defines human nature cross-culturally (as 
the pursuit of symbolic capital) but this definition is impossible to arrive at, since the 
universal meaning behind human practices cannot be depicted without the involvement 
of the observer. Giving a detached, cross-cultural account of what being human 
ultimately is about, could only be done by someone who is completely culturally 
unbound.  Such observer would have no access to meaning, however. 
It follows from the Heideggerian/Merleau-Pontian understanding of 
human finitude as our inevitable involvement in a particular understanding 
of reality that constitutes us, that, as Bourdieu recognizes and 
demonstrates, you cannot get out of your own sens pratique just by 
recognizing that you have one.42 
Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that Bourdieu´s persistence with defining sociology as a 
science leads to an untenable conflict as science has detached observation as its 
condition and Bourdieu cannot plausibly account for this within the confines of his 
theory of habitus.  
 
 
40 Philipse, 2002. 
41 Dreyfus & Rabinow 1993. 
42 Dreyfus & Rabinow 1993, 92 
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2.2 An outline of Heidegger´s and Bourdieu´s projects  
2.2.1 Martin Heidegger 
2.2.1.1 Heidegger´s project 
Heidegger´s thought has influenced the recent two generations of academics. His 
writings form part of the background for some of the most influential 20th century 
streams of thought in the humanities and philosophy such as Jacques Derrida´s 
deconstruction, Hans-Georg Gadamer´s hermeneutics and Richard Rorty´s 
contemporary pragmatism. His thought has also received critique for its alleged 
linguistic inaccuracy, most famously from Rudolf Carnap43.   
Heidegger was Edmund Husserl´s student and can be seen as an heir to Husserl´s 
phenomenological project. Heidegger redefined the project and in a way took it in his 
own name by creating a new chapter in the history of philosophy: the hermeneutical 
turn in phenomenology. The hermeneutical turn refers to Heidegger´s radicalizing the 
notion of interpretation in phenomenological inquiry. He claims that interpretation 
(understood as practical comportment) is the only way that human beings can relate to 
the world. Thus, interpretation becomes that on the basis of which reality is accessible 
in the first place. 
Being and Time carries influences from several different philosophical traditions such as 
Kierkegaardian existentialism, Husserlian phenomenology and medieval scholasticism.   
Explicitly the book is about the question of being, which is a theme of philosophical 
inquiry, Heidegger claims, the tradition so far has almost completely overlooked44.  
According to Heidegger, people always already dwell in some understanding of being, a 
holistic way of understanding what there is, which ways of being it has and how to deal 
with it. Finding out the meaning of being is the task of ontology, which has fundamental 
ontology as its starting point. Fundamental ontology examines how the being of Dasein 
makes possible other ways of being. 
43 Carnap 1931 
44 I am using the Macquarrie & Robinson translation of Sein und Zeit. They choose to write being with a 
capital B. I have left the capital B´s in the direct citations I make from Being and Time. Elsewhere I shall 
use lower-case b´s, because using the capital B in “Being” creates spiritual connotations I wish to avoid. 
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Heidegger states that his method of inquiry is phenomenological. This means studying 
things as they show themselves and is thus linked to the meaningfulness of our 
experience. According to Heidegger, things only can be experienced on the basis of 
them mattering to us.45  
The phenomenological method is also hermeneutical, as it is interpretative: The analysis 
of the structure of our experience cannot rely on simple scientific empiricism because 
Heidegger is after phenomena that are not perceivable at first hand but rather have to be 
disclosed. This disclosing can only be successful from the inside: experience cannot be 
described without sharing that experience, or the basis for that kind of experience.  
The hermeneutical character of the inquiry in Being and Time entails that we must start 
from Dasein´s initial, existentiell understanding of being. Only through that can a 
worked-out description of the universal structure of any understanding of being be 
reached. This does not necessarily make truth an invalid concept but makes empiricist 
truth-claims vague: what is there is only accessible through a situated experience, not 
through detached observation. 46  
Heidegger´s own notion of truth is aletheia, unconcealment. It is a kind of disclosing 
that is the condition of the possibility of truth in the sense of correspondence between 
statement and fact.47 Heidegger never finished the project of Being and Time but it 
forms an important part of his philosophical corpus. In it Heidegger writes about the 
question of being more systematically and elusively whereas later in his career his style 
becomes more opaque. 
Heidegger´s philosophy is by common practice divided into two historical phases, pre-
Being and Time and post-Being and Time. This division is based on the interpretation 
that as Heidegger was not able to finish Being and Time, he tried new ways of tackling 
the question of the meaning of being. Thus he developed an approach to philosophy so 
foreign to that of Being and Time that it became commonplace to draw a line between 
his pre- and post-Being and Time phases.  
45 BT, 51 
46 Polt 2002, 54 
47 BT, 263 
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Since I am primarily interested in Heidegger from the point of view of Pierre Bourdieu, 
who, although willing to delineate between “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II”, sees this 
philosophical project as a continuum, this distinction is not as relevant as it might be 
otherwise. I will be primarily discussing early Heidegger, or Heidegger I in Bourdieu´s 
terms, as the existential analytic of Dasein forms the major influence of Heidegger on 
Bourdieu48. 
 
2.2.1.2 Heidegger´s involvement with National Socialism and the ethics of this 
thesis 
Heidegger´s Nazi sympathies are an ethical issue that all Heidegger scholars should 
address. Heidegger became a member of the NSDAP (National Socialist Party of 
Germany) in 1933. Although not an active member, he was banned from teaching at 
university level until 1949 due to his accomplice activity during Hitler´s regime. He 
never issued an apology for his involvement with Nazism.  
According to Bourdieu, Heidegger´s politics cannot be separated from his philosophical 
work. Heidegger´s rhetoric, also in Being and Time, operates on two levels of 
signification, that of pure of philosophy and that of politics. Bourdieu uses Heidegger´s 
das Man as an example of a concept that on the level of pure philosophy refers to an 
existential possibility in Dasein, but on the political level refers to a tyranny of the 
masses. The latter is a negative phenomenon that drowns authentic individuality.   
Bourdieu states that giving Heidegger´s texts a narrow philosophical interpretation 
eclipses other, equally relevant interpretations: 
 Those who try to insist on sticking to the “proper” meaning of the text, 
 that is, a properly philosophical meaning, thereby granting this emphatic, 
 accentuated meaning the power to eclipse the other meanings suggested by 
 words which are in themselves vague and equivocal, and especially the 
 value judgements or the emotional connotations which their ordinary 
48 If not mentioned otherwise, when discussing Heidegger, I am always referring to early Heidegger in the 
text. 
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 usage entails, are in fact insisting that there is only one legitimate mode of 
 reading, that is, their own.49     
I shall be looking at the specifically philosophical influence that Heidegger´s thought 
seen as “pure philosophy” has had on Bourdieu. I do not do this to eclipse the political 
aspect of Heidegger´s work or to state that there is some “proper” meaning to his texts 
that should leave other meanings in its shadow: I acknowledge a political focus as a 
relevant path of interpretation, but other aspects can be looked at just as well. A 
philosophical reading of Heidegger is one path of interpretation that does not in any 
way need to claim to be the only true one. 
Each scholar has to assess on her own, what importance Heidegger´s political activity 
has in relation to his philosophical work50. I shall go through Bourdieu´s critique of 
Heidegger´s conception of das Man in this thesis. Bourdieu sees das Man as an early 
sign of Heidegger´s anti-democratic political thought. At the same time, however, this 
thesis is an attempt to show that Heidegger´s ontology also has a positive role in 
Bourdieu´s own thought. 
Bourdieu was part of the cultural and political left and his academic work is an attempt 
to provide tools for understanding and overcoming inequality. His thought is anti-
fascist, but still Heideggerian ontology is part of his work. I think this shows that 
Heideggerian ontology can be applied in any number of ways and is not as such bound 
to any political ideology. The fact that Heidegger was a Nazi has to be taken seriously, 
but his involvement with Nazism should not overshadow his positive contribution to 
philosophy. 
 
2.2.2 Pierre Bourdieu´s project 
Pierre Bourdieu trained originally as a philosopher but moved on to sociology and 
developed a methodology and conceptual framework of his own that has been highly 
influential within the social sciences and humanities.  His concepts habitus, the social 
49 PO, 104 
50 See e.g. Dillion 2003, 10 
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field, symbolic capital are central tools in the analysis of power structures and class in 
contemporary sociology.  
Bourdieu´s motivation for dropping philosophy in favour sociology can be found in his 
writings: He was interested in disclosing societal mechanisms that produce and shape 
power relations. According to Bourdieu, this can only be done through empirical 
evidence that philosophy could not and is not attempting to provide.  Bourdieu has 
brought out how culturally inconspicuous sources of inequality in opportunities get 
covered up: by misleading conceptions such as natural talent and hard work.   
Bourdieu´s thought is relational: fields are dynamic structures that define their elements. 
In contrast to substance ontology, each change in elements on a given field affects all 
the other elements. No permanent essences can be named. Bourdieu´s thought seeks to 
create a rupture between the everyday experience of entities as substances and the 
processual “real” that can be approximated with sociology51.  
Bourdieu develops further the Marxist theory of capital by naming other forms of 
capital to accompany the economical form: the social and cultural. According to 
Bourdieu, class is embodied and renewed in everyday practices that are rarely 
transparent to actors themselves. It is the task of the critical social scientist to disclose 
the hidden power structures that are embodied in these practices.   
Bourdieu, similarly to Anthony Giddens, attempts to combine two central points of 
view in contemporary sociology, those of agency and structural analysis. This 
dichotomy is historically based on two different ways of approaching society: 
understanding meaningful action and on the other hand examining structures that exist 
independent of the individual and also determine individual agency. According to Hans 
Joas and Wolfgang Knöbl, Bourdieu wants to place himself in the context of Giddens´ 
structuration, that “assumes that structures are `made´and continuously reproduced by 
actors. But at the same time – in contrast to the ideas supposedly expounded by pure 
action theorists – he also emphasizes the profound and causal impact of these 
structures”52.  
51 See Vandenberghe 1999 
52 Joas & Knöbl 2010, 381 
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Bourdieu´s theory of practice forms a synthesis of two contrary poles: One pole is 
objectivism, best exemplified by classical structuralism, trying to establish an 
understanding of culture by studying structures that work independent of human 
intentionality. The other one is subjectivism, which refers to a phenomenological 
account of culture with an emphasis on the everyday experience of the world. The 
synthesis involves, according to Bourdieu, a new element of temporal and unconscious 
but not rule-following practical agency.  
Agency and structures are in a dialectical relationship in Bourdieu. Agency makes 
structures come about, but those structures influence agency: there is a process of 
structuration that is located on the individual level and thus causal relations between the 
individual and structural levels are complex.  
Bourdieu´s important early work, Outline of a Theory of Practice, is an attempt to 
rethink sociological theory. It begins with a quote from Marx´s Theses on Feuerbach : 
 The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach 
 included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the 
 form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, 
 practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, 
 the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, 
 does not know real, sensuous activity as such.53 
The quote mentions two ways of attempting to grasp reality: natural science´s way of 
treating everything as meaningless object and idealism´s (for Bourdieu this would 
include Husserlian phenomenology) way of seeing the world as an everyday 
representation for a conscious being. Thus two methodologies have to be synthesized in 
a meaningful way in order to maintain the plausibility of sociology: objectivism and 
subjectivism. The aim of the Outline is to show how Bourdieu´s own method, the theory 
of practice, or “praxeology” is able to combine these two methods and avoid their 
theoretical weaknesses. 
 
Bourdieu uses objectivism as a pejorative term that refers to a reductionist tendency in 
53 Marx & Engels 1969, 13 
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the field of social and human science to attempt to explain agency and experience only 
in terms of static, transcendent structures and rule-following individuals. With the term 
objective he then again refers to critically and inter-subjectively evaluated theory, 
empirical research methods and results that social science can achieve. The same goes 
for the subjectivism-subjective –pair: Subjectivism is a limited scholarly point-of-view 
that is too attached to individual experience, whereas the term subjective refers neutrally 
to individual experience.  
Bourdieu´s critique of objectivism is that it is oblivious to the fact that social reality is 
created through agency by real actors. Objectivism´s favourite term “structure” hides 
beneath it the practice of carrying out tasks creatively, unlike machinery. Throop and 
Murphy sum this up by saying: “Objectivism, on the other hand, refuses to take account 
of individual actors’ actions, and instead relegates them to the social framework within 
which they function as virtual automatons, shackled to objective relations of social 
structure”54. 
The theory of practice pushes the actual, temporal unfolding of events to center stage. 
Reality is born out of practice and so is every representation of reality. Social science 
must then study the concrete forms of this unfolding: different social fields and the 
habitus that correspond to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 Throop & Murphy 2002, 189 
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3. HUMANS AND THE SHARED WORLD  
This chapter discusses Bourdieu´s and Heidegger´s conceptual pairs for describing the 
relationship between human beings and the world. It begins from the aspect of human 
beings by discussing Heidegger´s Dasein and Bourdieu´s habitus. Then it moves on to 
the shared world with Heidegger´s world and Bourdieu´s social field. Finally these 
conceptual pairs are compared with each other and thus will be shown how Bourdieu´s 
conceptual pair has a similar ontological function as Heidegger´s. 
 
3.1 Heidegger´s  Dasein and Bourdieu´s habitus 
3.1.1 Dasein in fundamental ontology 
Heidegger begins Being and Time by introducing the concept of Dasein. Dasein does 
not have properties, but possible ways of being:  
 Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of 
 it at all, he conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). – [T]hose 
 characteristics which can he exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' 
 present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-
 at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than 
 that.55 
A human being´s thingness does not constitute Dasein´s essence, because Dasein is not 
the same as a biological organism or physical body. Rather, Dasein is the openness that 
allows for the intelligibility of entities. It discloses a world by relating to it with various 
projects that are directed towards the future. This openness, being “the there” is 
Dasein´s essence. 
Heidegger proceeds from human being and the way of being peculiar to human beings. 
He calls this approach fundamental ontology due to his claim that it makes all other 
ontologies possible. In comparison with traditional ontology, fundamental ontology 
proceeds from human experience, our initial interpretation of reality, and relates all 
55 BT, 67 
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knowledge ultimately to this finite perspective. Dasein is the condition of the 
intelligibility of other ways of being.56 
The existential analytic is a hermeneutical inquiry into Dasein´s way of being. It is the 
pathway to understanding other ways of being.57 Dasein is a being that has an 
understanding of being and also a being that takes a stand on its own being through 
interpretation. Only Dasein´s self-interpretation gives us access to ways of being and 
thus it is the starting point for Heidegger´s fundamental ontology. It is important to note 
here that Dasein is the condition of the possibility of ontology but not entities per se. 
There could well be entities without Dasein but a “science of being” is dependent on 
Dasein.  
Dasein´s way of being is existence, which is to be understood in a specific way, not as 
existentia (lat.), which corresponds to present-at-hand in Heidegger´s terminology58. 
Existence is a process of becoming oneself through action: 
These entities [Dasein], in their Being, comport themselves towards their 
Being. -- Being is that which is an issue for every such entity. -- In 
determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a 
possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow 
understands.59  
Dasein´s  way of being, existence, is self-interpreting: being human is acting on given 
possibilities and becoming something. Because existence is not the way of being of an 
object, Dasein´s way of being also does not fall into categories, but rather 
existentialia.60 Whereas quality or quantity are important in describing physical matter, 
Dasein´s structural traits have to do with meaning and are about its involved relation to 
the world, not its properties as a detached object. They are essential structural 
characteristics of Dasein such as being-in (always being involved with the world) and 
das Man (sharing a context of interpretation with other Dasein).  
56 BT, 33-34 
57 BT, 34 
58 BT, 67 
59 BT, 67 & 69 
60 BT, 70 
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Dasein is said to be an ontological being: questioning about being is in its essence. On 
the ontic level each individual Dasein has an interpretation of its own essence and thus 
Dasein “is ontological”61.  From this however does not follow that each Dasein would 
have an explicit ontology. Rather only it has an ability and inclination to develop such. 
It is the job of philosophy to develop such an ontology based on the experience of 
Dasein. 
 
3.1.2 Habitus  
Habitus refers to a disposition (habit) of individuals to react in appropriate and socially 
conditioned ways in all situations. Dispositions are tendencies to act in certain ways in 
specific contexts. They are related to structures but do not completely determine 
individual agency. Habitus is similar to Dasein in the sense that it refers to human 
beings´ situatedness: Habitus accounts for meaningful experiences, an initial 
interpretation of the world and a bodily disposition to deal with the world. Like Dasein, 
habitus names possibilities of humans, not only the individual per se. Habitus is not just 
a new name for humans and neither is Dasein.  
Habitus is constituted in social relations. For Bourdieu, the autonomous transparent 
subject is an “anthropological presumption that has been inscribed into language”62 and 
the reasons that the subject gives to her own actions are not to be taken at face value. 
Instead of falling prey to prejudice about the subject, the theory of practice will explore 
the situations where subjects assume the role of subject.  On the other hand it also 
explores the conditions that need to be met for such situations to arise.  Bourdieu writes: 
 --[W]hen the embodied structures and the objective structures are in 
 agreement, when perception is constructed according to the structures of 
 what is perceived, everything seems obvious and goes without saying. It is 
 the doxical experience in which one attributes to the world a deeper belief 
 than all beliefs (in the ordinary sense), since it does not think of itself as a 
 belief. Against the intellectualist tradition of the cogito, of knowledge as a 
61 BT, 32 
62 PR, 8 
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 relation between a subject and an object, etc., in order to account for 
 human behaviours it is necessary to admit that they rest constantly on non-
 thetic theses; that they posit futures that are not aimed as futures.63 
Bourdieu wants to overcome the subject-object distinction by pointing out that the 
world is all too a central part of our experience to merit any kind of distinction between 
the world and a meaning-giving subject. Acting is for the most part not consciously 
aimed at goals. 
Habitus generates representations, so it is in charge of entities showing up in the same 
sense that Dasein is in Heidegger: an understanding of being is that on the basis of 
which entities are intelligible. Habitus is more strongly linked to the concrete process of 
inculcation of norms than Dasein: Social order is imposed on the individual´s body via 
habitus.  
Bourdieu explains the temporal process of reproduction: it is possible to predict 
(approximately) the habitus of a given individual by looking at that person´s social 
background.  Habitus is determined by different societal groups and the power structure 
of different fields. Dasein is also influenced by society through the phenomenon of das 
Man, but always has the radical freedom of choosing itself.  
Bourdieu wants us not to confuse the habitus with determinism: As embodied practice, 
habitus is not about following rules or any kind of conscious playing a game, but 
instead refers to the social, supra-individual condition of the possibility of our 
experience. Habitus is the logic of what shows up as meaningful to do and what rises up 
in the first place. It is the name for the tendency in people to experience certain choices 
and patterns of action more appealing than others. 64 
As an individual becomes socialized and acquires a habitus, she takes over a holistic 
understanding of what the world is like, doxa. This understanding is so basic that it does 
not only apply to beliefs or language but to the most mundane and unnoticed ways of 
getting around in the world: 
63 PR, 81 
64 In the sense of showing what is worthy of doing the habitus comes close to a Heideggerian artwork, 
which opens up a world that “is not simply the Open that corresponds to clearing, and the earth is not 
simply the Closed that corresponds to concealment. Rather, the world is the clearing of the 
paths of the essential guiding directions with which all decision complies.” (OWA, 96). 
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 Practical belief is not a “state of mind”, still less a kind of arbitrary 
 adherence to a set of instituted dogmas and doctrines (“beliefs”), but rather 
 a state of the body. Doxa is the relationship of immediate adherence that is 
 established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is 
 attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for –granted of the world that flows from 
 practical sense.65  
Doxa is a belief that is not conscious, so it should not be understood as a belief in the 
cognitivist sense. 
The logic of the habitus is to make something social appear as a result of individual free 
choice. There is a covering-up involved, a sense of the game (illusio): 
One of the functions of the notion of habitus is to account for the unity of 
style, which unites the practices and goods of a single agent or a class of 
agents-- The habitus is this generative and unifying principle which 
retranslates the intrinsic and relational characteristics of a position into a 
unitary lifestyle, that is, a unitary set of choices of persons, goods, 
practices.66 
Habitus translates socially acquired distinctions into personal choices and makes up a 
lifestyle. For Heidegger the stylistic aspect of habitus would part of the ontical make-up 
of some specific historical situation. What is ontological about habitus is that it opens 
the space of meaning, the world. At the same time it closes off other possible ways of 
being. The space of meaning is possible only as a clearing with boundaries. 
People with the same background, same subjectivity-forming conditions have 
approximately the same habitus. Habitus can be linked to different determinant factors 
in the traditional language of identity such as nationality, class position, gender et 
cetera. Bourdieu offers a terminology that helps us relate a person´s or a group´s habitus 
to concrete individual possibilities as each habitus corresponds with certain amounts of 
65 PR, 68 
66 PR, 8 
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symbolic capital in its different forms. A habitus is the manifestation of the structure of 
an agent´s capital.67 
Habitus is inscribed in the body. Bourdieu sometimes uses a separate term for the bodily 
aspect of habitus, body hexis, where hexis refers to a disposition. The bodily aspect of 
habitus would be something that fundamental ontology would not be interested in. 
Heidegger indeed does not discuss the body in Being and Time. Kevin Aho argues that 
the reason for this is that the body is understood in the way it is understood due to 
Dasein: 
 [Dasein] signiﬁes, rather, an unfolding background or space of meaning 
 that is already there, prior to any embodied experience or capacity. 
 Second, the “there”—the Da of Dasein—makes it possible for me to make 
 sense of my feelings, perceptions, activities, and emotions.68 
There is no “body” prior to meaningful experience for Heidegger. Bourdieu´s theory of 
embodied being-in-the-world thus takes a different route compared to the ontological 
account of intelligibility presented in Being and Time. Bourdieu explicitly treats the 
body as a material condition of the possibility of experience so that the social world and 
the body mutually condition each other. 
Now that the habitus and Dasein have been outlined, I will move on to examine the 
Heideggerian notion of world and the Bourdieusian social field. After this the four 
concepts, Dasein, habitus, world and social field, will be looked at together. 
 
3.2 Heidegger´s world and Bourdieu´s social field 
3.2.1 World 
I will introduce the Heideggerian concept of world in three parts. First I will explore the 
concept against a Cartesian backdrop and show how it differs from the Cartesian res 
67 D, 170-171 
68 Aho 2009, 110 
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extensa. Secondly I shall explore the world as the backdrop of different ways of being 
and finally thirdly go through the phenomenon of Dasein´s being-in-the-world. 
 
3.2.1.1 Heidegger´s critique of the Cartesian interpretation of world 
A central issue with Cartesianism for Heidegger is that a Cartesian world does not have 
meaning in it inherently. Meaning only resides in the res cogitans, the thinking being 
and this is ultimately guaranteed by God: Descartes believes that our clear and distinct 
ideas come from a perfect God that would not fool us. Thus our ideas are true 
representations of objects.69 The world for Descartes is just an extended space with 
objects in it. As for Heidegger, having a world is a condition of the possibility of human 
experience. The Cartesian world for Heidegger is simply nature interpreted as the object 
of study of the natural sciences.70 
The Cartesian world is discovered by taking meaning out of the Heideggerian notion of 
world: it is a deficient world and cannot account for the interconnectedness between 
Dasein and world. The Cartesian world is not connected to experience in the same sense 
as the Heideggerian world is. 
Descartes accepts the way of being of a substance as the only way of being, which is his 
greatest error according to Heidegger71. The being of a substance is characterized by 
independence: it would be there in the same way independent of other beings and its 
being perceived72. Thus it is constantly present. According to Heidegger´s account of 
being-in-the-world, things in the world are only first disclosed in Dasein´s involved 
dealings with them and as a part of a whole73. 
The world is not a background context of intelligibility for Descartes, but rather a 
present-at-hand entity just like any other being. When the world is seen as an entity that 
is a collection of all entities, different ways of being cannot be made intelligible.74 
69 Descartes 2010, 73 
70 BT, 128. 
71 BT, 131-132 
72 BT, 125 & Descartes 1933, pr. 51 & 54 
73 BT, 128-129 
74 BT, 130 
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 3.2.1.2 The ready-to-hand and present-at-hand 
Heidegger presents contextual traits that inhere in all activities: the in-order-to, which is 
the role of a piece of equipment in a particular situation (a hammer pounds nails), the 
towards-which, which is the aim of the activity carried out with the equipment (building 
a shelf) and the for-the-sake-of-which, which is Dasein´s ongoing self-interpreting way 
of being (being someone who is into DIY). The activity is also carried out with 
something, with-which, (a piece of equipment part of an equipmental whole) and in a 
context (the workshop).75  
This is an example that illustrates the way of being of equipment, which Heidegger calls 
readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit). The hammer as a piece of equipment does not show 
itself primarily as a substance with properties, but rather is transparently part of the 
activity of hammering that is carried out in the context of the workshop towards 
building a shelf, for example.76  
To understand what it is to be a hammer one must use it. It cannot be understood only as 
a physical object, because, as a tool, its being in use defines it, not just its physical 
make-up. A hammer only makes sense in the context of the workshop as a part of an 
equipmental whole with nails, work benches and the like. A hammer does not function 
as a hammer if it is taken out of its context. 
When the hammering for some reason breaks down, the equipmental context 
disappears. If the carpenter is able to get on with work, the equipment only shows up as 
un-ready-to-hand.77 But if the disturbance should continue and leave the carpenter 
reflecting the hammer as a sole piece of material, conscious reflection takes fully over 
and the hammer´s way of being becomes presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). It is now 
understood as a substance with properties. Natural science is according to Heidegger 
based on such observing things taken out of their meaningful context, as not mattering 
to us. 
75 BT, 118-119 
76 BT, 98 
77 BT, 103 
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The workshop example also shows that we do not primarily encounter things as objects 
that we, conscious subjects, disinterestedly contemplate. Instead, things show up within 
a structured world. Our acting in the world is first and foremost practical according to 
Heidegger, although this does not make reflection impossible.   
 
3.2.1.3 Being-in-the-world 
Heidegger´s account of being-in-the-world culminates with his separating the present-
at-hand being of objects in space from Dasein´s being-in, which is an existentiale78. 
Being-in-the-world means encountering things the way Dasein typically encounters 
them: by dealing with them in a practical context, so that the beings are discovered in 
their usability, as part of a context that would not be there if Dasein was not there. We 
encounter things mostly as ready-to-hand.  
Being-in-the-world has the character of “always-already”. All action takes place in a 
world amidst other beings that are experienced as something. There is no prior state of 
Dasein where only brute facts are experienced. Instead, experience consists of specific 
interpretations of entities and their ways of being, as well as dealing with them. This 
phenomenon is also referred to as Dasein´s facticity.79 
Dasein´s interpreting activity has a fore-structure. This fore-structure is actually the 
structure of understanding, but it is always implied in interpretation. This structure is 
that of fore-having (Vor-habe), fore-sight (Vor-sicht) and fore-conception (Vor-griff). 
Fore-having is the context of involvements in which Dasein acts, fore-sight is the 
perspective that Dasein has on the context and fore-conception is how the interpreted 
phenomenon is conceived, grasped in advance. This constitutes Dasein´s hermeneutical 
situation. This three-fold structure is always in place and is the pre-condition of any 
experiencing. Thus every perception of any entity within the world is based on prior 
interpretation.80 
78 BT, 81 
79 BT, 83 
80 BT, 191 
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Now that the phenomenon of world has been introduced, I will move to discuss its 
Bourdieusian counterpart, the social field. 
 
3.2.2  Social field 
The social field is Bourdieu´s concept for the structured backdrop that forms individual 
styles and experiences. Bourdieu´s theory of practice has as its goal to bring out the 
practical production of social structures in the agency of humans (and vice versa: bring 
out the production of agency in social structures).  This practical production is temporal 
and takes place on a dynamic social field of power struggle with multiple human agents: 
 -- we cannot grasp the dynamics of a field if not by a synchronic analysis 
 of its structure and, simultaneously, we cannot grasp this structure without 
 a historical, that is, genetic analysis of its constitution and of the tensions 
 that exist between positions in it, as well as between this field and other 
 fields, and especially the field of power. The artificiality of the distinction 
 between history and sociology is most evident at the highest level of the 
 discipline--81 
The merge of history and sociology becomes a study of temporal social practice that 
takes place on social fields. As a result, supra-individual structures are discovered that 
have enough stability to merit their identification but that also undergo constant 
transformation, i.e. social fields. 
For Bourdieu, humans are embodied structures on defined social fields that renew or 
transform these structures. Bourdieu´s account of the social field as a world entails a 
Heideggerian critique of the Cartesian concept of world as substance.  
In Bourdieu human being is not, like it is for the Cartesian tradition, thinking in its 
essence. It is rather acting in a temporal, pragmatic context and to add to that, largely 
non-reflective acting. The same can be said about Heidegger: Dasein for the most part 
concernfully deals with entitities and knowing something about the entities requires a 
deficiency in the concernful mode of acting82. 
81 IRS, 90 
82 BT, 88 
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Fields are also the source of intelligibility for individuals. The habitus is “the field 
internalized” and ultimately what is seen, heard and sensed is relative to a field, very 
much like Heidegger´s world. Fields could be described as historical regimes of 
intelligibility not unlike Wittgenstein´s  form of life83: they offer an interpretation of 
what the world is like that translates into an individual´s habitus. 
The distribution of capital between groups and individuals in a society forms its power 
structure for Bourdieu. These power structures are formed according to universal 
regularities: 
--all societies appear as social spaces, that is, as structures of differences 
that can only be understood by constructing the generative principle which 
objectively grounds those differences. This principle is none other than the 
structure of the distribution of the forms of power or the kinds of capital 
which are effective in the social universe under consideration - and which 
vary according to the specific place and moment at hand. -- [The global 
social space is] a field of struggles within which agents confront each 
other, with differentiated means and ends according to their position in the 
structure of the field of forces, thus contributing to conserving or 
transforming it structure.84 
The social field is a spatial metaphor for describing a society from the point of view of 
power struggle and dynamic. Bourdieu sees the structure of a field as universal (“all 
societies appear as social spaces“), which makes the struggle for power a universal 
principle. The dynamic of fields revolves around individuals who attempt to collect 
symbolic capital, i.e. power. As all social action has a law-like tendency to organize 
itself into fields with positions, no-one can escape the struggle for power.  
The field does not only designate a singularity that covers all action, but on the side of 
the general field of society, several sub-fields can be named and they can be said to 
83 Wittgenstein 1986 
84 PR, 32 
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have autonomous histories. This entails that they are not completely determined by a 
societal super-structure. 85 
Bourdieu uses the concept of interest to describe the motives of action for an individual 
on a field. Each subfield has a specific interest connected to it and as individuals are all 
connected to a field, all individuals also have some interest they are pursuing. Another 
term, illusio, denotes the way that agents take seriously the game played on a specific 
field.  
The content of interest is not universal so interest is not human nature according to 
Bourdieu. Rather, interests are field-specific and historical. What is universal is that 
individuals act on the basis of an interest that a specific field generates. These interests 
can be found out “only through historical analysis, ex post, through empirical 
observation”, which implies that the self-understanding of the individuals is not relevant 
for finding out what the meaning of the practices within a field is86.   
Heidegger does not discuss the historical nature of interest in Being and Time. 
Individuals do carry out projects that are connected on common meanings and invest an 
interest in those projects. However, there is no structure of capitals that would motivate 
the projects, instead they are pure self-interpretation, simply what Dasein does. 
 
3.3 Habitus and social field as versions of Dasein and world 
There are significant similarities between the concepts of habitus and Dasein. Both 
designate a holistic temporal disposition, an ability to be that is carried out by 
individuals that comes from the shared world. Although the role of the social in the 
coming about of Dasein is not clearly stated in Heidegger, he like Bourdieu sets the 
intelligibility of being on a foundation of a shared world.  
For Bourdieu, as for Heidegger, present-at-hand (“objective”) entities ground 
experience. This experience is flow-like and entities are inconspicuous for the most part. 
The social world shows itself as meaningful in the first place and the inter-connected 
85 SQ, 165 
86 IRS, 117 
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field and habitus are in the background as the source of meaning. For Heidegger, 
Dasein´s experience is dependent on the independent existence of other beings than 
itself. The present-at-hand is accessed through the ready-to-hand, but the present-at-
hand is the reason for the existence of the ready-to-hand: 
 To lay bare what is just present-at-hand and no more, cognition must 
 first penetrate beyond what is ready-to-hand in our concern. 
 Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in 
 themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially. Yet only by reason of 
 something present-at-hand, 'is there' anything ready-to-hand.87 
Although Bourdieu does not use the Heideggerian terminology for different ways of 
being and being-in-the-world, he makes a distinction between the flow of experience 
and its objective conditions of possibility similar to the passage above88.  
The social field can be referred to as a background because habitus, human being as a 
process, is the field internalized. There is a dialectic relationship between habitus and 
field: the field “creates” the habitus of a group or an individual which then vice versa 
goes on to reinforce and transform the field. Similarly, the initial interpretations that 
Dasein makes have their origin in the public world89. 
The phenomenon of facticity, although not a term used by Bourdieu, applies to habitus 
in the same way that it applies to Dasein. As all humans are socialized into specific 
types of dispositions in Bourdieu´s theory, they always factically experience the world 
as something. Entities, “representations” and dealing with them have habitus and the 
social field as a condition of their intelligibility.  
A difference between habitus and Dasein is that Bourdieu wants to bring out differences 
between groups that up to him have remained invisible for social scientists. His 
concepts are tools for differentiating. For Heidegger differences lie between authentic 
and inauthentic modes of being but not on a group level. In Bourdieu different groups 
have different kinds of habitus and that is what ultimately keeps them apart, whereas in 
87 BT, 101   
88 See, e.g. IRS, 11 & PM, 21. 
89 BT, 167 
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Heidegger every individual Dasein´s choice between authentic self-interpretation or 
inauthenticity is the critical difference.  
The field differs from world in the sense that the former is an arena for power struggle 
and thus has a dynamic inter-subjective character. The Heideggerian world then again is 
a background of intelligibility for each Dasein and is shared as that background. 
Heidegger provides no account of positions as a structural trait of worldhood. The 
character of power is very different in early Heidegger, where power is primarily 
discussed as conformism. For Bourdieu, power is domination that a societal group 
imposes on another.  
The most relevant similarity between the two pairs of concepts is that the relations 
between Dasein and world and between habitus and field are similar. Bourdieu explores 
this relation further in an interview: 
Habitus contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world, a 
world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing one's 
energy - -  It is because this world has produced me, because it has 
produced the categories of thought that I apply to it, that it appears to me 
as self-evident. In the relation between habitus and field, history enters 
into a relation with itself: a genuine ontological complicity, as Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty suggested, obtains between the agent (who is neither a 
subject or a consciousness, nor the mere executant of a role, the support of 
a structure or actualization of a function) and the social world (which is 
never a mere "thing," even if it must be constructed as such in the 
objectivist phase of research).90 
Here Bourdieu most explicitly talks about the social field as a world in the Heideggerian 
sense. The ontological complicity between habitus and field or Dasein and world is a 
central similarity. Things first and foremost show themselves as meaningful in everyday 
experience. Only some kind of rupture (sociological or fundamental-ontological) with 
the meaningful experience can bring to the fore the constitutive role the world/field has 
in our experience. 
90 IRS, 127-128 
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Bourdieu mentions that the world is not a thing and thus refers to Heidegger´s critique 
of the Cartesian definition of world as a substance, res extensa. Bourdieu is more 
straight-forward about socialization, but in other aspects his analysis is similar to 
Heidegger´s account of the world. 
For both Heidegger and Bourdieu, Cartesianism does not only stand for Rene Descartes´ 
philosophical works but rather is a tradition of thought that is at work in present day 
thinking too: It needs to be refuted or dissolved precisely due to its being current – as 
“intellectualism” for Bourdieu and “substance ontology” for Heidegger. Both Bourdieu 
and Heidegger go against the Cartesian subject-object –distinction and more directly 
against the notion of a transcendental subject. The main difference between them is that 
Bourdieu criticizes Heidegger for not taking the critique long enough as Heidegger does 
not go through the historical genesis of Dasein in Being and Time.  
There is a difference between Heidegger´s existential possibilities and Bourdieu´s 
dispositions in terms of freedom. Dispositions are partially pre-determined tendencies to 
act in certain ways, whereas existential possibilities are choices that Dasein can make. 
Dasein is completely free to dwell in its everyday fallenness, in das Man, or to answer 
the call of conscience91. Doing the latter entails choosing amongst Dasein´s ownmost 
existential possibilities92. Authenticity is choosing one´s own way, inauthenticity is not 
choosing at all but rather taking what the public world offers. Habitus then again is not 
easy to change: an agent´s freedom to choose is limited in Bourdieu. 
Bourdieu´s theory of the social field names many social determinants of agency that 
Heidegger does not account for. This also leads to the differences in the role of freedom 
in their thought mentioned above. Heidegger´s thought gives Dasein a freedom to 
choose itself in the factical situation it is in. Social determinants are simply conformism 
that may be overcome, not a structural constraint like in Bourdieu. The authentic mode 
of being for Dasein is that where it acts freely on its ownmost possibilities. 
 Bourdieu however leaves only a margin of freedom for individual choice: structural 
constraints can only be overcome by becoming conscious of them, but even then only 
partially. Ultimately, from the Bourdieusian perspective, we are always playing some 
91 BT, 220 
92 BT, 331 
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game in the social field. Thus freedom does not entail an end to playing but rather 
changing the rules of the game. 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown both similarities and differences between 
Bourdieu and the early Heidegger. The defining similarity is that habitus and the social 
field have an ontological character in Bourdieu´s thought. They structure practice and 
account for the intelligibility of human experience. Other ways of being than that of 
humans can be studied only on the basis of the field as a historical space of 
intelligibility.93 Like Heideggerian fundamental ontology, Bourdieu´s account of 
habitus and field sets the foundation for other, regional ontologies.  
However, different from the world of early Heidegger, Bourdieu´s social field has a 
historical character: instead of the manifold existentialia, he only names the struggle for 
symbolic capital as a universal trait of human being. Thus the historically changing 
power dynamic of the field has a central role for our understanding of being than in 
Heidegger. The Bourdieusian pair of concepts is modelled on the Heideggerian account 
of Dasein and world but departs from it. Bourdieu aims to show that meaningful agency 
in the social world is defined by struggle for social positions. 
Bourdieu´s account is complementary in relation to Heidegger, as he examines 
empirically, how habitus comes about through socialization and how it is inculcated in 
the body. Bourdieu takes the Heideggerian model of being-in-the-world as a starting 
point of an empirical account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 See chapter five for a detailed account. 
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4.  PHENOMENOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS AND SCIENCE 
This chapter relates Heidegger´s early philosophy to Bourdieu´s account of science, 
objectivity and reflexivity. Heidegger´s account bases scientific discovery on being-in-
the-world, whereas Bourdieu relates it to the scientific field and its criteria of 
rationality. I will begin by describing the role of phenomenology and hermeneutics in 
Being and Time. Then I will discuss early Heidegger´s philosophy of science. Next I 
will move on to Bourdieu´s critique of phenomenology and his accounts of the scientific 
field and reflexivity. After this I will compare the relationship between phenomenology, 
hermeneutics and science in Bourdieu and Heidegger.  
 
4.1 Heidegger´s philosophical approach and its relationship with science 
4.1.1 Heideggerian phenomenology 
Heidegger interprets the word phenomenology by elaborating the terms phenomenon 
and logos and their Greek words of origin. He argues that the original meaning of 
phenomenology is “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in 
which it shows itself from itself”94. This refers to Dasein´s disclosing activity through 
which entities become intelligible in the first place. Heideggerian fundamental ontology 
in fact is phenomenology, as it attempts to make explicit disclosing and how on the 
back of this disclosing can entities show themselves within-the-world. Phenomenology 
concerns the being on entities: 
 --as phenomenology, is ontology possible. In the phenomenological 
 conception of "phenomenon" what one has in mind as that which shows 
 itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and 
 derivatives.95 
Heidegger develops his early phenomenology in relation to Husserl96, whom he 
criticizes for taking the being of entities in nature as a primary mode of experience. 
94 BT, 58 
95 BT, 60 
96 The Husserl of the 1920s of course, thus excluding his later, extensive philosophical career. 
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Heidegger wants to be able to give an account of our immediate experience of each 
other: as persons that are more than objects with a spiritual and psychological stratum97. 
Explicit mentions of Husserl have been left out of Being and Time. It however contains 
a formulation of phenomenology that, as Dermot Moran puts it, without mentioning 
Husserl is in relation to him: 
 In Being and Time, Husserl’s notion of intentionality is replaced by a 
 phenomenological account of Dasein’s practical comportments within the 
 world of practical relations with things (Zuhandensein). This leads 
 Heidegger to revise Husserl’s conception of intentionality and finally to 
 drop it altogether in favour of the conception of Dasein’s 
 transcendence.98 
The Heideggerian notion of comportment dissolves the model of the intentional, 
meaning-giving subject.  Klaus Held points out however, that Heidegger found use for 
Husserl´s notion of pre-intentional givenness: 
[Heidegger] regards the lasting philosophical outcome of the discovery of 
categorical intuition to consist solely in this, that in such an intuition the 
trans-subjective pre-givenness of a dimension of openness announces 
itself which, as a ground of the possibility of being and true knowledge, 
links the two together in an a priori manner99 
Husserlian phenomenology may have helped Heidegger discover the shared world 
through the categorical intuition. Phenomenology for Heidegger is a way of bringing 
out the givenness of the world in experience prior to any effort of construction. The 
world always shows itself to Dasein as such and phenomenology is the description of 
this givenness. The phenomenology is hermeneutical, as the world´s givenness is 
always interpreted. 
 
 
97 HCT, 125 
98 Moran 2000, 231 
99 Held 1992, 305 
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4.1.2 Science and Heideggerian hermeneutics 
According to Charles Taylor´s hermeneutical definition, humans are self-interpreting 
animals. This entails that interpretation is also the basis of all science. The sciences only 
have access to objects because a world has been disclosed by Dasein. Understanding is 
an existentiale and world-disclosing happens through Dasein´s involved dealings. 
Dasein projects itself into possibilities in understanding and acts in the world by 
interpreting things as something100. The latter is founded on understanding´s 
functioning in the background of action101.  
By carrying out the existential analytic, Heidegger discovers interpretatively the 
structure of Dasein´s way of being. This interpretation secures the possibility of the 
sciences.102 Only through Dasein´s being-in-the-world can entities show up and thus be 
made objects of scientific examination. Entities can be discovered first hand only 
within-the-world and this discovery has the fore-structure of understanding. Thus the 
conditions of the possibility of science lie in the hermeneutical constitution of Dasein. 
This is the essential insight of Heidegger´s philosophy of science. 
Heidegger delineates his inquiry from empirical science as follows: 
We must always bear in mind, however, that these ontological foundations 
[Dasein´s way of being] can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses 
derived from empirical material, but that they are always 'there' already, 
even when that empirical material simply gets collected.103 
The question of the different ways of being is not one that gets raised by empirical 
sciences as they are ontical and speak about beings and their characteristics. They 
require fundamental ontology as their basis because all ontologies must start from the 
given world, not collected evidence. 
Any collecting of empirical evidence is made possible by it being there in the first place. 
It is this more fundamental being there, disclosing, that fundamental ontology is after. 
100 Possibilities are ways that entities can be acted upon that make sense and are found within Dasein´s 
facticity as always already surrounding it in a given situation (BT 184-185). 
101 Hoy 1993, 183 & BT 191 
102 Lafont 2005, 268 
103 BT, 75 
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In order for there to be discovery of evidence, the world has to be disclosed in 
interpretation. This is the difference between the ontical and ontological activities. All 
sciences operate on a delineated area of being that must be disclosed in the first place. 
This disclosing must have taken place so that the entities studied can be perceived in the 
first place.104 The role of fundamental ontology is even more primordial. The meaning 
of being, i.e. the temporalization of temporality through Dasein´s dealings, makes all 
regional ontologies possible.105 
 
4.2 Bourdieu on science and fields 
4.2.1 Bourdieu´s critique of phenomenology 
Loïc Wacquant describes Bourdieu´s account of phenomenology as follows: 
 For Bourdieu, sociology must subsume phenomenology not by pushing it 
 aside, but by grounding intersubjectivity in historical objective structures 
 via the genetic analysis of the constitution of habitus.-- In particular, 
 Bourdieu goes beyond the  subjectivist apprehension of practical sense to 
 investigate the social genesis of its objective structures and conditions of 
 operation. 106 
Bourdieu sees phenomenology as a study of the way things show themselves. He also 
sees that complementing this experiential perspective is possible through the study of 
“objective structures”. In this view is implied that phenomenology is subjectivism for 
Bourdieu. 
Bourdieu´s critique of phenomenology is primarily aimed at Husserl. This formulation 
of the critique refers to Husserl´s Ideen:  
104 BT, 30-31 
105 BT, 31 
106 IRS, 20 
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 The phenomenologists systematically forget to carry out an ultimate " 
 reduction ”, the one which would reveal to them the social conditions of 
 the possibility of the "reduction” and the epoche.107 
The problem Bourdieu has with phenomenology is that cannot account for the genesis 
of experience, as it takes what appears to consciousness as its point of departure. 
Heidegger indeed is not interested in any genesis of experience in terms of socialization 
or biology, but in Dasein´s disclosing activity that opens up a world in the first place. In 
this sense Bourdieu´s theorizing and empirical study of socialization could be seen as a 
complementary effort rather than an objection in relation to Heidegger: Bourdieu shows 
how Dasein comes about.  
However, from a Heideggerian point-of-view any (empirical or un-empirical) inquiry 
can only depart from what shows itself in Dasein´s temporal experience, as disclosed108. 
Things can be experienced as present-at-hand entities only by detaching them from their 
practical context. An account of the genesis of experience must take interpretations as 
its point of departure. In this sense, Heidegger´s thought seems to refute the 
Bourdieusian criticism. 
By studying the social and theoretical conditions of the possibility of experience, 
Bourdieu´s praxeology yields structures that are outside the scope of phenomenology: 
 Just as objectivist knowledge poses the question of the conditions of the 
 possibility of primary experience, thereby revealing that this experience 
 (or the phenomenological analysis of it) is fundamentally defined as not  
 posing this question, so the theory of practice puts objectivist knowledge 
 back on its feet by posing the question of the (theoretical and also social) 
 conditions which make such knowledge possible.109 
Bourdieu claims that phenomenology does not question its own conditions of 
possibility, namely the social conditions of the possibility of experience. Bourdieu´s 
praxeology carries out such analysis of the social production of experience. Individual 
experience comes about through the inculcation of societal norms, values and bodily 
107 OTP, 233 
108 BT, 263: ”--the uncoveredness of entities within-the- 
world is grounded in the world's disclosedness.” 
109 OTP, 4 
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postures. Inculcation is the social condition of the possibility of experience and hence 
also of knowledge that is produced in a given society. 
Bourdieu seems to reduce phenomenology to a mere interpretative description of 
experience, whereas Heidegger sets it as the starting point and necessary condition of 
the possibility ofany knowledge. Bourdieu offers the scientific field and its rules of 
production as a way out from endless competing interpretations: even if all knowledge 
departs from experience, the scientific field guarantees the production of objective 
results. 
  
4.2.2 A Bourdieusian take on hermeneutics: Field-specific rationality and 
reflexivity 
Vera King suggests that Bourdieu´s “hermeneutics” would be his account of the 
obstacles and conditions of the possibility of knowledge, i.e. his account of reflexivity 
and understanding110. Thus rather than working out an account of understanding in 
general, Bourdieu relates understanding to social perspectives. Understanding is 
structured by the social field and the social world is better understood through the 
conceptual framework of the social field and habitus than by only studying our 
interpretative way of being.  
Bourdieu claims that the social context defines individual experience in specific ways 
that can be discovered objectively through social science. Social science must depart 
from hermeneutics and study things as they show themselves to people. However, 
systematic, quantifying observation leads social science to an objective truth about the 
social positions of the objects of study.111  
For Bourdieu, the social world reveals itself in practice and can only be perceived in 
terms of a field. The social scientist views the world from the perspective of the 
scientific field, which is a particular kind of field: it allows for an over-arching view of 
other fields and reveals the social world as an aggregate of fields and stakes. The 
110 King 2004, 51 
111 ”But I cannot comprehend this practical comprehension unless I comprehend both what distinctively 
defines it, as opposed to conscious, intellectual comprehension, and also the conditions (linked to 
positions in social space) of these two forms of comprehension.” (PM, 130).   
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scientific field is thus a kind of super-field that guarantees that knowledge concerning it 
and other fields can be reliable and objective. 
Bourdieu´s aim is different from natural science. As sociology studies social 
phenomena, it has to view things “from the inside”, as they show themselves to the 
actors in the social world. Bourdieu does not attempt to reduce different perspectives 
into one absolute perspective of the scientist.112 He wants to be able to account for 
socially situated human experiences, which aim can mostly be ruled out when it comes 
to natural science. Human experience is necessary for Bourdieu: it is where the social 
world reveals itself in the first place and what any attempt at revealing objective 
structures (beyond a representation in terms of a particular field) must choose as its 
point of departure.   
If all accounts produced on fields are relative to a historically specific rationality of a 
field, how is then Bourdieu´s metanarrative possible as an objective, ahistorical account 
of the functioning of fields in general? How is the social scientist´s account any less 
limited to its own field and “language game”? 
Bourdieu´s answer is that the criteria of coherence, experimentation, lack of 
contradiction and other conditions of scientific knowledge are inherent to the scientific 
field and only to that field. The scientific field allows for objectively valid knowledge to 
show up. The field creates 1) an interest for its players to be truthful and 2) thus allows 
its players to produce knowledge ( e.g. map out objective social relations like Bourdieu) 
that would not be created without the field and its historical constitution. 
This entails that albeit the scientific field has its stakes and players just like any other 
field, the rules of the scientific field create a situation where successful maximizing of 
capital is tied to respecting said conditions: “to win there, one has to win with 
arguments, demonstrations or refutations”113. Truth and knowledge are sought after as 
they allow for agents on the scientific field to increase their power.  
Scientific knowledge is produced on a field which has a double face of interest and 
power relations on the other hand, and restraints of rigorous scholarly activity on the 
other: 
112 Jain 2013, 8 
113 PM, 109 
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 Scientific competition presupposes and produces a specific form of 
 interest, which appears disinterested only in comparison with ordinary 
 interests, in particular those for power and money, and which is oriented 
 towards winning the monopoly of scientific authority, in which technical 
 competence and symbolic power are inextricably combined. But, in its 
 specific dimension, it differs from all other fields (more or less, depending 
 on its degree of autonomy, which varies according to the speciality, the 
 society and the period) in the organized and regulated form that 
 competition takes there, in the logical and experimental constraints to 
 which it is subject, and the cognitive ends it pursues.114  
(Scientific) reason has a historical origin, but it can produce results that are true beyond 
the context in which they were reached:  
 
 We have to acknowledge that reason did not fall from heaven as a 
 mysterious and forever inexplicable gift, and that it is therefore 
 historical through and through; but we are not forced to conclude, as 
 is often supposed, that it is reducible to history.115 
Bourdieu thus attempts to rescue scientific knowledge from historical and 
phenomenological relativism. This is not achieved by placing scientific results in a 
transcendent ahistorical sphere of truth, but by giving them a specific position according 
the process through which they are produced.116 
How are then particular (social) scientists bound by their holistic habitus´ supposed to 
move beyond those limits? How is sociology to reach objectivity beyond any specific 
understanding of the world? This is where Bourdieu´s notion of reflexivity comes in. 
Reflexivity in Bourdieu entails objectivizing the social scientist herself as well as the 
scientific field. 
 [O]bjectivation of any cultural producer demands more than pointing to 
 and bemoaning his class background and location, his "race," or his 
114 PM, 110 
115 PM, 109 
116 See also Vandenberghe 1999, 58 
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 gender. We must not forget to objectivize his position in the universe of 
 cultural production, in this case the scientific or academic field.117 
Bourdieu is here referring to objectivizing as bringing out an element in relation to a 
field that makes it possible: Agents are active elements that have a position that 
excludes other agents from that position in a particular field118. Bourdieu is thus 
implying that a science of oneself can be objective.  
Reflexivity entails an analytical division of the subject into two: the experiencing and 
the empirical. The experiencing side is the self of phenomenological, un-empirical 
accounts. The empirical is the subject positioned in relation to a social field. It can be 
examined as a scientific object. Reflexive sociology turns its attention to the empirical 
side of the knowing subject, which has been overlooked by the tradition:  
To practise reflexivity means questioning the privilege of a knowing 
'subject' arbitrarily excluded from the effort of objectification. It means 
endeavouring to account for the empirical 'subject' of scientific practice in 
the terms of the objectivity constructed by the scientific 'subject' - in 
particular by situating him at a determinate point in social space-time - and 
so acquiring a more acute awareness and a greater mastery of the 
constraints that can be exerted on the scientific 'subject' through the links 
which bind him to the empirical subject, his interests, drives, and 
presuppositions, and which he must break in order to constitute 
himself. 119 
It is relevant to bring out not only a researcher´s relation to the divisions at the macro 
level in society but also her position in the specific social field and the power that that 
position brings. That is the way in which an objective description of whatever social 
phenomenon is reached.  
The hermeneutical point Bourdieu wants to make is that the position of an agent can be 
uncovered through an account of their experience and social position. Theorists see the 
social world from a perspective that is constituted by their position on the social field: 
117 IRS, 69 
118 PM, 134 
119 PM, 119-120 
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As soon as we observe (theorein) the social world, we introduce in our 
 perception of it a bias due to the fact that, to study it, to describe it, to talk 
 about it, we must retire from it more or less completely. This theoreticist 
 or intellectualist bias consists in forgetting to inscribe into the theory we 
 build of the social world the fact that it is the product of a theoretical gaze, 
 a "contemplative eye." 120 
Theorists easily see their findings as simply objective descriptions. They forget that the 
descriptions are produced in exclusive circumstances and that they only offer one 
vantage point on society. Still, social theory reaches a more accurate understanding of 
reality than any subjective perception. 
The upshot of this is not that theoretic knowledge is worth nothing but that 
we must know its limits and accompany all scientific accounts with an 
account of the limits and limitations of scientific accounts: theoretical 
knowledge owes a number of its most essential properties to the fact that 
the conditions under which it is produced are not that of practice.121 
The objectivity that Bourdieu is referring to is limited and not a complete mirror of 
reality. In order to do objective science one must be in a specific social position. 
Practice cannot be fully grasped with a theoretical gaze and made intelligible outside 
itself. 
Being and Time´s account of reflexivity would be the existential analytic as an account 
of the conditions of the possibility of different interpretations of being. It does not try to 
situate scientists in relation to any field as that would be outside the scope of 
fundamental ontology. Heidegger thinks, though, that he has brought out the ontological 
conditions of any account of being.  
Ultimately, Bourdieu is interested in causally explaining human agency. He is not 
satisfied with any purely experiential analysis as the basis of understanding human 
being. Thus he needs to expand his view from the perspective of the objects of study 
(e.g. a group of working class males in France) to the detached, objectifying perspective 
120 IRS, 69 
121 IRS, 69-70 
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of the scholar on the scientific field (e.g. Bourdieu the social scientist).122 Hermeneutics 
is thus more a methodological tool for Bourdieu than a universal ontological principle.   
There is a dialectic between phenomenological hermeneutics and social theory in 
Bourdieu. Hermeneutics shows the interpretations that people make and social theory 
grounds these interpretations into social determinants. Interpretation is used 
instrumentally to situate an actor on the social field. A description of an actor´s point of 
view goes through an objectivizing process where it is contextualized in terms of the 
actor´s objective social position.123 The dialectic moves between the experienced, 
“subjective” in Bourdieu´s terms, and the “objective”, the social structures in the 
background of agency: 
 In fact, we cannot escape the indefinite series of mutually refutable 
 interpretations – the hermeneuticist is involved in a struggle among 
 hermeneuticists who compete to have the last word about a phenomenon 
 or an outcome – unless we actually construct the space of objective 
 relations (structure) of which the communicative exchanges we directly 
 observe (interaction) are but the expression.124 
On the other hand, the hermeneutic also applies to the researcher herself: she has a 
practice that can not be reduced but can be causally related to her social position. 
Now that Bourdieu´s and Heidegger´s relation to phenomenology, hermeneutics and 
science has been introduced, I will move on to comparing the two thinkers with each 
other from this perspective. 
 
4.3. Phenomenology in early Heidegger and Bourdieu 
Bourdieu and Heidegger both devise a re-interpretation of phenomenology, and both 
accounts distance themselves from their Husserlian point of departure. Their accounts of 
phenomenology differ significantly.  
122 PM, 129-130 
123 Hamel 1997, 108 
124 IRS, 256 
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Throop and Murphy state in their article “Bourdieu and Phenomenology – A Critical 
Assessment” that Bourdieu´s critique and thus conception of phenomenology is 
inaccurate and based on straw-man arguments125. They claim that Bourdieu 
“misrepresents phenomenological approaches when he criticizes them for naively 
restricting their inquiry to a description of the life-world and not searching for the 
generative structures underlying it”126.  
On Heidegger´s part, the life-world could be equated with Dasein´s everyday, pre-
ontological understanding of being, which Heidegger contrasts with an ontological 
understanding that can be reached through fundamental ontology. This understanding, 
although departing from the everyday pre-ontological understanding, aims at 
interpretatively reaching the meaning of being. 
Bourdieu´s criticism of phenomenology is only partially applicable to Heidegger´s 
notion of phenomenology. Heidegger is not satisfied with just the human everyday 
understanding of being. Bourdieu´s criticism of ignoring generative structures is 
applicable to Heidegger. Heidegger does not rely on the social sciences or history in 
order to provide an account of the conditions of the possibility of human experience. 
Heidegger is in fact not attempting to provide any such account, even though Bourdieu 
thinks that he should as Bourdieu´s own approach is empirical-historicist. 
The Heideggerian account of phenomenology is similar to Bourdieu in that it describes 
the world´s givenness without rooting it to a transcendental ego. Bourdieu complements 
this givenness with an account of the social conditions of the possibility of experience. 
Heidegger then again sees this givenness as the pre-ontological clue for fundamental 
ontology. 
Throop and Murphy concentrate on defending Husserlian and Schutzian 
phenomenology from Bourdieu´s attacks. Thus they bring to the fore the fact that the 
spearhead of Bourdieu´s critique of phenomenology might not have been directed at 
Heidegger in the first place. Rather it is aimed at Husserl, who holds on to the 
transcendental ego. Bourdieu does critique Heidegger for not bringing to the fore the 
conditions of the possibility of experience as something historical or, in other words, 
125 Throop & Murphy 2002 
126 Throop & Murphy 2002, 191 
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historicizing it. This critique insists that the existentialia, Dasein´s structural elements, 
are presented as ahistorical. However, Bourdieu is perhaps in no position to criticize 
Heidegger for this, as his own model of the structure of the social world is also 
ahistorical to an extent. 
 
4.4  Hermeneutics and science in early Heidegger and Bourdieu 
Phenomenology is linked to hermeneutics in both Bourdieu and Heidegger. Heidegger 
explicitly describes his phenomenology as hermeneutics. Then again, Bourdieu´s  
“phenomenological” pole of praxeology is an interpretive, hermeneutical activity 
although he does not explicitly call it that. Bourdieu and early Heidegger draw different 
conclusions with regards to the role of interpretation and experience in science.  
For early Heidegger, scientific research is based on the world that Dasein discloses. 
Entities need to have been disclosed as entities in the first place in order to make false 
or true judgments about them. The field of scientific reasoning as a social field is not 
paid attention to in Being and Time. Instead, early Heidegger talks about Dasein as 
“ontological”, which is an ahistorical, fundamental characteristic of Dasein. The 
fundamental human tendency to ask questions about being is not a field-specific 
phenomenon but pertains to every Dasein in potentially every situation.  
Heidegger seeks the conditions of the possibility of scientific activity from Dasein´s 
way of being as the “there” (Da) that allows for entities to show up and not from the 
historical social field like Bourdieu. Science is historical, it has historical phases and its 
concepts and conceptions change. But that Dasein interprets entities, is not historicized. 
Scientific results in different ages, or as Thornton and Christensen express it, all 
“temporal schematisations of being”, are based on Dasein as a space of meaning: 
 [T]he existential analytic is meant to give us access to our understanding 
 of Being as such, an understanding we are supposed to have prior to any 
 specific theoretical enterprise or indeed practical undertaking. And we 
 access this understanding of Being as such in order to answer the question 
 of Being, that is, in order to provide an account of the different ways 
 Being is temporally schematised or applied across all modes of 
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 engagement with entities. To provide such an account is to show how the 
 regional ontologies of specific disciplines are possible, and cannot, 
 therefore, be a move made within any one of these regional ontologies.127 
Bourdieu does not find the basis of science in fundamental ontology. He, like 
Heidegger, thinks that the actors´ initial understanding of the social world is the only 
available access to the social world. However, this does not lead Bourdieu to think that 
self-interpretation alone could discover the essential structures of our understanding of 
being.  
For Bourdieu, in addition to human experience, the intrinsic characteristics of the field 
of scientific research are what make the ontical sciences possible. Scientific methods are 
employed because individuals on the scientific fields can better or maintain their social 
position by adapting to the rules of the field.  
Bourdieu stresses the social conditions of the possibility of agency because they are also 
the condition of the possibility of science. There can only be science when there is 
agency, but simultaneously must there be a social context out of which agency comes 
about. Thus the dialectic between the social field and agency forms a condition of the 
possibility of science.  
In Bourdieu the field complements the Heideggerian hermeneutical situation, because it 
is a determinant of experience that can be discovered only through the methods of the 
social sciences128.  The field is a field of relations: Any individual element gets its 
position within the field according to its relation to other elements. The truth about any 
agent´s position or the field can only be reached by studying the whole of the field.  
Bourdieu and the early Heidegger agree on the meaningful, always already interpreted 
hermeneutical situation that envelops human beings. However, the two thinkers 
disagree on the role of empirical research: for Heidegger, the hermeneutical situation 
implies that un-empirical interpretation can discover what is to be discovered about 
Dasein. For Bourdieu, hermeneutic study of agency combined with empirically 
grounded social theory is necessary for understanding human being. From a 
127 Thornton & Christensen 2010, 4 
128 Vandenberghe 1999, 51-52 
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Bourdieusian perspective, human being actually only exists through its different 
historical instantiations and not as a universal phenomenon. 
 
4.5 Objectivity and the tension between historicism and universalism in Bourdieu´s 
ontology 
Dreyfus and Rabinow state that Bourdieu is contradictory concerning the objectifying 
work of the scholar because “as Bourdieu recognizes and demonstrates, you cannot get 
out of your own sens pratique just by recognizing that you have one”129. 
Bourdieu goes to great lengths explaining how a holistic habitus gives the individual a 
cultural understanding of the surrounding world. It so pervasive, that it should not be 
possible to fully bring the social world under the eye of the scholar herself: 
 [H]abitus are also classificatory schemes, principles of classification, 
 principles of vision and division, different tastes. They make distinctions 
 between what is good and what is bad, between what is right and what is 
 wrong, between what is distinguished and what is vulgar, and so forth--
 The social space is indeed the first and last reality, since it still commands 
 representations that the social agents can have of it.”130 
According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, there would not be a problem if Bourdieu were 
happy to drop the plea to objectivity. Thus, if Bourdieu were to only talk of 
interpretations that we have and refining them, his approach would have a solid basis. 
Bourdieu´s understanding of social science is that with the right methodology it is 
possible to bring out objective structures in a society. These structures restrict the 
individual´s freedom but through the study of structures can an individual overcome 
them. This overcoming is reached through a thorough examining the limitations of 
one´s own cultural position. Dreyfus and Rabinow do not find this problematic as such, 
but assert that any overcoming of one´s situated position will not make an individual 
able to spell out the objective meaning of practices. Meaning is a question of finite and 
129 Dreyfus & Rabinow 1993, 92 
130 PR, 8 & 13 
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uncertain interpretation, whereas the positions people hold on the social field can be 
established objectively. 
Charles Taylor expresses the problematic of meaning and situatedness through an 
example in “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”:  
An emotion term like "shame" can only be explained by reference to other 
concepts which in turn cannot be understood without reference to shame. 
To understand these concepts we have to be in on a certain experience, we 
have to understand a certain language, not just of words, but also a certain 
language of mutual action and communication, by which we blame, 
exhort, admire, esteem each other. In the end we are in on this because we 
grow up in the ambit of certain common meanings.131 
A fully cross-cultural account of phenomena such as shame, that are culturally specific, 
seems impossible on this account. Then again, according to Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
Bourdieu, with the help of the concept of symbolic capital, is giving seemingly 
culturally specific and multiple practices a common meaning, which is not accessible to 
the members of the culture. So, rather than interpreting any subjective or cultural 
meaning-giving, Bourdieu seems to claim to see beyond the self-understanding of 
individuals or cultures as a whole and claims to be able to give a more truthful account 
of the meaning of practices than members of any culture. 
 
Taylor goes on, in a Heideggerian vein, to discuss the possibility of predicting human 
behaviour:  
With changes in his [man´s] self-definition go changes in what man is, 
such that he has to be understood in different terms. But the conceptual 
mutations in human history can and frequently do produce conceptual 
webs which are incommensurable, that is, where the terms can't be defined 
in relation to a common stratum of expressions.132 
131 Taylor 1971, 13 
132 Taylor 1971, 49 
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Any permanent definition of the true meaning of human practices seems to go against 
the principle of historicity that Bourdieu himself is holding on to so dearly. Definitions 
of what it is to be a human being vary and, intertwined with this variation, humans act 
differently. Here appears the tension between the historical and the ontologico-
metaphysical in Bourdieu´s thought. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow conclude that Bourdieu´s account of the meaning behind our 
practices is metaphysical. “Metaphysical” refers here to securing a firm foundation for 
the essence of entities, such as human beings. Although Dreyfus and Rabinow base their 
critique of Bourdieu´s alleged position partially on Heidegger, they also mention that 
Heidegger is doing something similar to Bourdieu in Being and Time: 
Like Heidegger in Division Two in Being and Time, one could look for an 
explanation of this ontological complicity: namely, that the interestedness 
of everyday life – that is, the illusion that there are intrinsic meaningful 
differences – is a motivated cover-up of the basic arbitratriness of human 
purposes, sedimented in the social field, which Heidegger calls 
“fallenness”. Bourdieu opts for the cover-up story.133 
The difference between Bourdieu and early Heidegger, according to Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, is not so much the fact that Bourdieu is attempting to map out some meaning 
behind a multiplicity of practices. It is rather that Bourdieu calls this mapping out a 
science, whereas Heidegger calls it philosophy. By calling it science Bourdieu, 
according to Dreyfus and Rabinow´s Kuhnian/Popperian model of science, must only 
offer arguments that can be falsified. The claim about a truth of human nature as 
maximizing symbolic capital is not falsifiable. 
Bourdieu (1993) answers to Dreyfus and Rabinow in the article “Concluding Remarks: 
For a Sociogenetic Understanding of Intellectual Works”. He denies Dreyfus and 
Rabinow´s  interpretation according to which all human agency is an attempt at 
maximization of symbolic capital and asserts that “they do it [everything people do or 
say] to perpetuate or to augment their social being”134. 
133 Dreyfus & Rabinow 1993, 90 
134 CR, 274 
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In his answer Bourdieu accepts Dreyfus and Rabinow´s interpretation of his attempt of 
doing ontology, as long as it is understood as a “historicist ontology”135. This 
historicism means that Bourdieu is describing the universal structures of social life that 
have specific historical instantiations. Bourdieu is giving an ahistorical essence to the 
social but not humans per se. However, this claim is ambiguous and does not seem to 
offer a tenable way out of the problematic as sociality and humanity are inter-
connected: anything said about sociality in general pertains to humans in general.  
Dreyfus and Rabinow´s critique is correct, but their claim about a Bourdieusian human 
nature is too strong. Bourdieu´s theory of social relations on fields is linked to humans 
in general. His historicist ontology entails that social fields have universal, ahistorical 
characteristics, which entails that human behaviour has universal, ahistorical 
characteristics. Thus Bourdieu´s theory makes weak but positive universal claims about 
human agency. However, this does not support the claim that an account of human 
nature is implicit in Bourdieu´s theory. 
In conclusion, Bourdieu´s views on science, phenomenology and hermeneutics differ 
from Heidegger. Although Bourdieu sees phenomenological hermeneutics as the other 
pole of praxeology, he stresses that a better account of the social world is arrived at, as 
historically changing objective structures are studied also. As phenomenological 
hermeneutics does not account for the social conditions of the possibility of Dasein, the 
empirical study of social practices is necessary. The basis of science for Bourdieu is in 
objective structures, namely the scientific field and its criteria of rationality. Only with 
the specific type of scientific practice that is brought about by this historical field can 
science function.  
The disclosing of entities that is the basis of Heidegger´s philosophy of science is found 
in Bourdieu: For science to function there must be a space of meaning (i.e. 
Dasein/habitus). Bourdieu complements this starting point with an empirical description 
of the scientific field with scientific practices. The field ultimately guarantees objective 
results. 
Bourdieu claims to be doing objective science and his social ontology forms a basis for 
this activity. Against Dreyfus and Rabinow, he claims that he is not asserting a specific 
135 CR, 273 
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human nature, but rather describing the functioning of fields and their effects on social 
practice. However, the characteristics that Bourdieu is willing to impose upon humans 
are sociality and the universal tendency to form fields in social action. In the next 
chapter I shall further explore the accounts of practice, temporality and sociality in 
Bourdieu and Heidegger. 
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5. PRACTICE, TEMPORALITY AND SOCIALITY 
This chapter discusses the Heideggerian account of sociality, the temporality of practice 
and their relation to the Bourdieusian account of social pratique and its temporality. 
Heidegger and Bourdieu have both been compared to pragmatist philosophers because 
practice has a central place in their thought as the concrete, temporal unfolding of 
events. They use different terms for describing this unfolding but they both see practice 
as the locus of “originary” temporality.  
I will begin by discussing sociality in Heidegger through the concepts of Dasein-with 
and das Man. Then I will explore early Heidegger´s account of practice. I will introduce 
the various terms that Heidegger uses to discuss the flow of concernful dealing and how 
this dealing is related to temporality and history. Next I will move to Bourdieu´s notion 
of sociality. I will relate it to practice as pratique and discuss temporality as an 
unfolding of practice. Then I will discuss how Bourdieu inadequately addresses 
Heidegger´s account of the social by omitting its constitutive role for Dasein. I will 
show how Bourdieu´s and Heidegger´s accounts of the temporality of practice have 
similarities, but differ when it comes to the role of historicity. 
 
5.1 Practical dealings, temporality and sociality in Heidegger 
Early Heidegger roots human being to a shared world. Existence has the characteristic 
of being-with (Mitsein), which is an existentiale. Being-with is differentiated from being 
with one another (Miteinandersein), which is the factical happening of being-with.136  
Without other human beings, there could not be a world or being-in-the-world because 
the existence of such is only possible if it has culture as its source: 
 This common world, which is there primarily and into which every 
 maturing Dasein first grows, as the public world governs every 
 interpretation of the world and of Dasein.137 
136 BT, 157                                                                                                                                                                                      
137 HCT, 246 
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The common, public world is also what pushes Dasein away from owning up to its 
ownmost possibilities. Thus, besides being a condition of the possibility of our 
experience, it is what makes us inauthentic.138 
The “public” world (der öffentlichen Welt) is not similar to the social field: the notion 
of “public” does not entail the Bourdieusian specific dynamic between social positions 
nor the inculcation of social norms through socialization. The public world is rather 
only a practico-discursive space where interpretations of being are shared. The public 
world is not to be conflated with the notion of world. The world always functions as the 
practical context of intelligibility of some particular Dasein. The public world is a non-
personal, non-particular sub-phenomenon that is dependent on Dasein´s being-in-the-
world and that offers interpretations of being to particular Daseins. Publicness is an 
aspect of the phenomenon of world.139   
 
5.1.1 Dasein-with and das Man 
The role of the social in early Heidegger comes out in Being and Time most clearly in 
the chapter on das Man. Dasein-with (Mit-Dasein), existing with other Daseins, is an 
“equiprimordial”, equally founding existential characteristic of Dasein, as being-in-the-
world. The world is shared with other Daseins and thus dealing with things happens in 
the context of shared equipmental wholes: 
Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. 
The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with 
Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mit-
Dasein]. 
--- 
Yet even the positive Interpretation of Dasein which we have so far given, 
already forbids us to start with the formal givenness of the "I", if our 
138 HCT, 247 
139 See also Glendinning 2001, 59. According to Glendinning the publicness of the world in Heidegger is 
aimed to overcome the solipsism of philosophies of the isolated subject. The originary sociality of Dasein 
is not emphasized in Being and Time. 
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purpose is to answer the question of the "who" in a way which is 
phenomenally adequate. In clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown 
that a bare subject without a world never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever 
given. And so in the end an isolated "I" without Others is just as far from 
being proximally given.140 
The world is shared with others and there is no isolated “I”: being a self has the shared 
world as its pre-condition. Heidegger does not explicitly say that Dasein comes about 
through socialization. However, the world as a shared background makes possible 
Dasein´s reflexive understanding of itself and of said world: 
Knowing oneself [Sichkennen] is grounded in Being-with, which 
understands primordially. It operates proximally in accordance with the 
kind of Being which is closest to us - Being-in-the-world as Being-with; 
and it does so by an acquaintance with that which Dasein, along with the 
Others, comes across in its environmental circumspection and concerns 
itself with – an acquaintance in which Dasein understands.141 
Heidegger does not have a conception of society in Being and Time142. He does not 
relate the being of Dasein to different institutions, politics or wealth. All such things are 
ontical from Heidegger´s point of view and only possible because of the clearing that 
Dasein is. Heidegger does not attempt to build a model of socialization as a way of 
“acquiring” Dasein. The genesis of Dasein does not interest Heidegger. Dasein simply 
exists and because of that, can anything be said to “be”. 
Heidegger comes closest to any model of social action through his notion of das Man. 
The term is a neologism formed from the common passive Subject “man” in the 
German language. When we want to speak about how something is done without 
referring to a specific person or subject, we say “so macht man das”. Thus, das Man is 
this happening personified and made into a noun. It is the common way of going about 
one´s life. 
140 BT, 152 
141 BT, 161 
142 Heidegger´s notion for an authentic community is “the people” (Volk). This is not a model of society 
however, but “Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation'” (BT, 436). 
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Heidegger´s das Man seems to have two different functions in Being and Time: it is the 
basis for intelligibility on the other hand and a drowning out of individuality on the 
other. Possible translations for das Man are “the they”143, “the one”144  and “the 
Anyone”145. The ambiguity of das Man lies in the fact that Heidegger uses the term in 
both an ontic, pejorative and an ontological, positive way. As Carleton B. Christensen 
puts it:  
Heidegger seems simply to be conflating tasks: on the one hand, the task 
of providing an account of das Man as a condition of the possibility, 
indeed an ontological character, of Dasein and its Being-in-the-world, on 
the other, the task of providing a cultural critique of modernity in the 
manner of Kierkegaard.146 
Christensen proposes an interpretation of das Man that incorporates both the ontic and 
ontological significations, which Dreyfus also does by naming an average and a 
primordial understanding of the world147. 
Das Man as an ontological, positive source of significance is introduced in the 
following passages of Being and Time: 
Dasein is for the sake of the "they" in an everyday manner, and the "they" 
itself Articulates the referential context of significance. When entities are 
encountered, Dasein's world frees them for a totality of involvements with 
which the "they" is familiar, and within the limits which have been 
established with the "they's" averageness. Proximally, factical Dasein is in 
the with-world, which is discovered in an average way.148 
 
------ 
From the kind of Being which belongs to the "they"-the kind which is 
closest-everyday Dasein draws its pre-ontological way of interpreting its 
Being. In the first instance ontological interpretation follows the tendency 
143 BT 
144 Dreyfus 1991 
145 Blattner 2006 
146 Christensen 2012, 264 
147 Dreyfus 2000, 155 
148 BT, 167   
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to interpret it this way: it understands Dasein in terms of the world and 
comes across it as an entity within-the-world.149  
Das Man always provides a general understanding, an interpretation of being that is not 
in relation to any particular Dasein´s situation. Dasein may take this general and vague 
interpretation further in its unique interpretative activity. Das Man is the who of Dasein, 
or rather the way in which everyday Dasein acts.  
Das Man is not a considered way of acting but rather something that people do because 
one simply acts in that way. This acting according to an etiquette is not reflective, but 
the pressure to do so is strong: “What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination 
by Others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as Being-with. One 
belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power”150.  
Das Man is used as a pejorative, ontic term when Heidegger speaks of the “dictatorship 
of das Man”151. Acting the way one does is each Dasein acting without considering 
their unique situation. It is conformism. On the other hand, das Man is an existentiale 
and thus is essential for Dasein on the ontological level152. This being essential is due to 
the fact, that everyday averageness is what human beings have to start with. As a being 
that is always already in the world, Dasein does not experience brute facts, but rather a 
meaningful reality. Those meanings are derived from das Man. 
 
5.1.2 Care and social practices  
As the phenomenon of social practices forms an important connection between 
Bourdieu and Heidegger153, we need to understand how it is to be interpreted and in 
what way Heidegger refers to it. 
Hubert Dreyfus sums up Being and Time´s account of social practices as follows: 
149 BT, 168   
150 BT, 164 
151 BT, 164 
152 BT, 167 
153 See e.g. Dreyfus 1991, 17 
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Heidegger thus claims to be doing a sort of hermeneutics that lays the 
basis for all other hermeneutics by showing that human beings are a set of 
meaningful social practices and how these practices give rise to 
intelligibility and themselves can be made intelligible.154 
Heidegger does not use the plural “social practices” as Dreyfus does, he rather uses such 
concepts as “dealings” (Umgang) and “comportment” (Verhalten) and “praxis”. These 
concepts refer to the directed way in which we always encounter things: with a prior 
interpretation of them in place that makes it possible for things to show up. As this 
activity presupposes a shared world, it can be referred to as social, thus becoming social 
practices in Dreyfus´ vocabulary.  
“Dealings” refers specifically to interaction with entities whereas “comportment” more 
generally designates acting in the world. The concepts of dealings and comportment are 
not supposed to be juxtaposed with a theoretical understanding but rather, comportment 
is always a characteristic of our activity: all theoretical and practical activity is directed 
towards things that are understood as something. This is Heidegger´s essential insight: 
Things can initially only be experienced within a world.   
Heidegger´s account of practice is introduced in the existential analytic through the 
concept of care (Sorge), Dasein´s existential meaning. This entails that practical 
involvement with entities is what human being ultimately boils down to. 
We are primarily using equipment in situations where neither we nor the equipment are 
present as objects that are reflected upon. Only secondarily do we become aware of 
things reflectively. This insight is related to Heidegger´s anti-cognitivism as he thinks 
that cognitive behaviour has no priority over the practical but that they both are ways of 
relating to the same world: 
 'Practical' behaviour is not 'atheoretical' in the sense of "sightlessness" The 
 way it differs from theoretical behaviour does not lie simply in the fact 
 that in theoretical behaviour one observes, while in practical behaviour 
 one acts, and that action must employ theoretical cognition if it is not to 
 remain blind; for the fact that observation is a kind of concern is just as 
154 Dreyfus 1991, 34 
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 primordial as the fact that action has its own kind of sight. Theoretical 
 behaviour is just looking, without circumspection.155  
Circumspection is keeping an eye on equipment while in flow. Non-circumspective 
looking is only a different, more detached way of keeping an eye on things. Heidegger 
stresses that observing is a kind of concernful dealing in the world, too. It has the world 
disclosed in comportment as its background. 
Along with the concept of care, Heidegger introduces the concept of dealings 
(Umgang): 
The Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can he 
exhibited phenomenologically if we take as our clue our everyday Being-
in-the-world, which we also call our "dealings" in the world and with 
entities within-the-world.-- The phenomenological question applies in the 
first instance to the Being of those entities which we encounter in such 
concern.156      
We encounter things in the world by taking care of them, which means that things come 
to our attentions because they have some meaning to us.  Dasein´s primary157 way of 
looking at things is not detached observation but rather dealing with the world158.  
Heidegger thinks that knowledge of present-at-hand objects is a secondary mode of 
concernful dealing. In this mode things are not used according to their role in the 
equipmental whole, but instead are met by “tarrying alongside” them.159 
 
 
 
155 BT, 99 
156 BT, 95 
157 Primary in the sense that this relation is the condition of the possibility of other types of relations: We 
always already have an interpretation of the world and only on the basis of this can be start broadening 
our horizon. 
158 BT, 116 
159 BT, 88  
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5.1.3 Originary Temporality 
Practice is a temporal unfolding. Temporality is the ultimate horizon of meaning in 
Being and Time. Dasein´s projects map onto time and experience is temporal in general. 
Because Dasein is finite and also is the openness that allows for entities to show up, 
everything that shows itself shows itself temporally. Temporality as the meaning of 
Dasein´s being is what makes “clock-time”, ordinary linear time, possible. Only insofar 
as there is a meaningful unfolding of experience, can ordinary time be conceived of.  
As Kevin Aho puts it, the three modes of time, past, present and future, affect our 
existence in our everydayness:  
 In the present, I “fall prey” (verfallen) to the habits, roles, and assumptions 
 of the public world as I go about my everyday life. However, my everyday 
 involvement with things is always mediated by the “past” and the “future,” 
 by the temporal structures of “situatedness” (Befindlichkeit) and 
 “projection” (Entwurf).160 
The temporal and finite experience of Dasein is what allows for entities to show up. 
Even the laws of nature in their ahistorical existence, in order to be discovered, are 
dependent on Dasein´s disclosive activity. 
Dasein is originary time, understood as the activity of temporalization. This entails 
acting in the world and letting the world show itself through that activity: 
 Not "time is" but "Dasein qua time temporalizes its being." Time is not 
 something which is found outside somewhere as a framework for world 
 events. Time is even less something which whirs away inside in 
 consciousness. It is rather that which makes possible the being-ahead of-
 itself-in-already-being-involved-in, that is, which makes possible the 
 being of care.161 
Originary temporality is neither some “inner experience” nor measured, socially agreed 
upon time. It is rather the condition of the possibility of such experiences and 
160 Aho 2009, 25 
161 HCT, 319-320 
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perceptions, i.e. the ground of all experience. Measuring time is only possible insofar as 
there is Dasein as meaningful, temporally structured disclosing activity. 
Heidegger sees Dasein´s temporality as the condition of the possibility of objective 
history. As a temporalizing opening, Dasein´s projections in the world create history as 
an interpretation of the past that is made in the present and oriented towards the future. 
History is possible through the finite, temporal and practical interpretation that Dasein 
has of it. The past does not exist as an objective whole but comes about through 
Dasein´s invested orientation to the future that appropriates the past. This is called 
Dasein´s historicality (Geschichtlichkeit). No objective history (Historie) can be 
conceived of without the pre-condition of Dasein´s temporality.162   
Now that Heidegger´s account of social practice and temporality has been presented, we 
shall move on to Bourdieu´s views on these phenomena. 
 
5.2 Sociality and the temporality of practice in Bourdieu 
5.2.1 Sociality 
 
Loïc Wacquant describes Bourdieu´s notion of social practice as monism163. Bourdieu 
refuses the Cartesian dualism between subject and object. He stresses that there are 
different but equally important perspectives on the social world such as individual 
experience and scientific knowledge. One cannot be reduced to the other. Like 
Heidegger, Bourdieu opts for a view on social reality that includes different modes of 
experience and thus different disclosed areas of the real (for Heidegger these would be 
the different modes of being). 
The social world is being collectively upheld. People are born into it and it produces 
meaningful differences in their everyday lives. Thus social reality is a product of social 
practice. Different levels of representation such as subjective experience and 
sociological description are all part of the social.  
162 BT, 41 
163 IRS, 19-20 
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The social and its historical flux are the foundation of Bourdieu´s thought. In his 
comment in iichiko intercultural on history, Dasein and Welt, Bourdieu calls society 
“history”164. Social practice structured by fields is what history ultimately is. It is more 
primordial than Dasein, because its structure is the basis of any entities that show up. If 
we want to discover the truth about the world, we must study the structures of the social 
world.  
The social world is a disclosing in the sense of the Heideggerian originary truth, 
aletheia. However, the social world does not reveal itself to humans as it is but rather as 
a cover-up that needs to be unmasked. Entities do show up to human beings but this is 
only a finite and skewed representation of the world. The truth is discovered by social 
science that reveals the social structures that condition said representations.  Here 
Bourdieu´s account of the social conditions of the intelligibility of experience is a 
complementary effort in relation to Heidegger´s account. 
Bourdieu´s thought is social ontology because he gives a description of the social world 
and its entities. He builds this ontology on fundamental ontology but also claims that 
empirical sociology can lead to the discovery of truths that Heideggerian fundamental 
ontology does not reach. These are the structure of social fields, capitals and habitus. 
Social science is given the place of originary interpretation as the true revealer of the 
meaning of being. It studies the practice of human beings but specifically as a socially 
structured practice. 
 
5.2.2 Temporality, ontology and practice 
On the practical micro-level, Bourdieu sees time as “temporalization” . Time as entity is 
ordinary time, “clock-time” as Heidegger puts it. But the time of practice is not an 
entity, but rather the structure of lived experience. The “point-of-view of the acting 
agent” reveals that “practice is not in time but makes time (human time, as opposed to 
biological or astronomical time)”165. So the time of lived experience (which according 
to Heidegger is “originary”) is created by the unfolding of practice as agents relate 
themselves to entities. 
164 EPTH, 11 
165 PM, 206 
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Time unfolds in our practical expectations in the world. Temporality first comes about 
as the structure of our meaningful dealings: 
 Thus, the experience of time is engendered in the relationship between 
 habitus and the social world, between the dispositions to be and to do and 
 the regularities of a natural and social cosmos (or a field). It arises more 
 precisely, in the relationship between the practical expectations or hopes 
 which are constitutive of an illusio as investment in a social game--. 166 
Time is also connected to social position. Only those in exclusive positions can allow 
practical temporality to cease and be “liberated from time”167. Ordinarily practical 
temporality is experienced on a field where people compete over positions. Time is 
immersion in the game.  
Bourdieu finds a “plurality of times”:  
 [O]ne would need to describe the different ways of temporalizing oneself, 
 relating them to their economic and social conditions of possibility. The 
 empty time that has to be 'killed' is opposed to the full (or well-filled) time 
 of the 'busy' person who, as we say, does not notice time passing--.168 
The temporalizing aspect of practice is not one. Instead, different kinds of dealings with 
the world create different kinds of temporal horizons. Again, historical, socio-economic 
conditions of possibility need to be examined in order to reach an understanding of the 
phenomenon according to Bourdieu. A mere introspection by a qualified scholar only 
yields an account of her time, not time in general. 
Bourdieu´s theory of practice sets temporal practice at the center stage of social reality. 
Actual temporal practice is the “real”. Only this unfolding exists in Bourdieu´s 
historicist ontology. Few atemporal essences can be discovered, other than the social 
field with its structure of capitals. 
166 PM, 208 
167 PM, 209 
168 PM, 224 
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However, Bourdieu´s account of social fields weakens his historicism: The structures of 
social fields may vary historically but it is ahistorical and global that they have a 
structure of positions. As Bourdieu puts it, his theory of fields and habitus has 
“universal validity” and applies to all “relatively autonomous social worlds”169. 
Bourdieu´s research program was built for studying concrete societies and specific 
social situations, an inquiry that takes place on the ontical level in Heideggerian terms. 
The general framework he is offering is however ontological. 
Bourdieu´s historicist ontology accepts some ahistorical structures. Social ontology 
aims at giving an account of that which is not subject to time, such as the organization 
of social life into fields, habitus´ and capitals in Bourdieu. He does not ultimately 
historicize any of these structural concepts but only the way they show themselves in 
different contexts. 
 
5.3 Bourdieu´s one-sided interpretation of sociality in Heidegger 
Bourdieu harshly goes against Heidegger´s conception of das Man. The essence of his 
critique is that the early Heidegger was trying to establish a privileged position for 
philosophers by downgrading empirical social sciences. The social sciences were giving 
a description of average human being, which for Heidegger is inauthentic and levelling 
down.170  
The critique Bourdieu offers echoes his thoughts presented elsewhere: Heidegger´s 
attempt to overcome finitude with fundamental ontology does not take into account 
genuine historical knowledge. Bourdieu criticizes Heidegger´s view that an account of 
the past is only possible through fundamental ontology that brings to light the limiting 
preconceptions of the historical sciences171. According to Bourdieu, Heidegger´s pure 
philosophy as un-empirical reflection that attempts to overcome its finite position, needs 
historical and empirical research to back it up. 
169 EPTH, 9-10 
170 PM, 26 
171 PM, 27 
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Bourdieu´s antipathy for das Man –theorizing is understandable from a wider political 
perspective, too. He is, unlike the early Heidegger, not interested in authenticity, as his 
sociological theory tells us that all authenticity and inauthenticity only apply to a certain 
social field. What is more interesting for Bourdieu are the power relations in those 
different fields. Examining society´s power structures with the methods of the social 
sciences is more relevant than finding out who is authentic and who is inauthentic. 
Bourdieu also points out that authenticity is only attainable from a “position of 
privilege”. Leading a free, authentic life and escaping “objective determinations” 
requires leisure time that is not available for everyone.172 
 
It seems that, as there are two different ways of interpreting  das Man, one concentrated 
on norms and the other normative in itself, a different reading of the concept might have 
brought Bourdieu to accept a positive role for das Man. Understood simply as the 
source of everyday intelligibility, a provider of norms and practices that make social life 
possible, das Man is closer to habitus than to any existentialist, elitist critique of the 
public sphere. Averageness as a term acquires a broader meaning with this 
interpretation as “the customary or normal comportment that we acquire along with our 
general familiarity with things and people”173. But understood as a critique of 
conformism, das Man does not hold up to Bourdieu´s anti-intellectualist scrutiny. 
Conformism is also an aspect of the ambiguous conception das Man, but Bourdieu 
concentrates on that side too exclusively and overlooks a similarity between himself and 
Heidegger.174 
 
5.4 Practice, temporality and sociality in Heidegger and Bourdieu 
Both Bourdieu and Heidegger emphasize the practicality of agency and the tendency of 
the epistemological tradition to overlook the role of practice in human experience. They 
both view practice as more than conscious and goal-oriented praxis. On the level of 
content their views converge. Both thinkers emphasize that our practical relations in the 
172 LP, 291. 
173 Dreyfus 1991, 153 
174 BT, 165   
73 
 
                                                          
world have a temporal structure that is more basic than “normal time”. Neither of them 
considers time to be primarily an entity that has objective presence. 
Bourdieu´s conception of skholè refers to a special, scientific position that makes 
neutral observation possible. This position consists of not only a deficient mode of 
practice, but also of socio-economic factors that make possible the time and effort put in 
simply observing.175 In this sense Bourdieu´s view of the theoretical gaze is richer than 
Heidegger´s, or in any case contains more historical specifications. Bourdieu claims that 
reason has a historical grounding and that scientific knowledge is only possible due to 
very specific privileges enjoyed by academics, such as time and economic security. This 
view is tied up with his understanding of fields as the background that allows for 
entities to show up. Only thanks to specific positions on the scientific field is it possible 
to produce objective knowledge.    
For Bourdieu, practical situations vary and have certain social contexts as conditions of 
their possibility. Thus any abstract, phenomenological account of practice will not cover 
the phenomenon in its entirety. Socio-historical factors account for the phenomena that 
show themselves to people. A philosopher might have no access to the practice and 
experience of people who live in a different cultural and socio-economical situation. A 
social scientist, then again, can study their practice. There is perhaps no pure practice 
for Bourdieu, put rather practices in the plural.  
Both Bourdieu and Heidegger have an account of, in Heidegger´s terms, the  
“temporalizing of temporality”, of the temporal structure of practice176. This originary 
temporality makes ordinary time possible. 
Bourdieu differs from Heidegger by maintaining that temporality can only be properly 
understood by relating it to socio-economic factors. Different positions on the field 
produce different kinds of temporality. For instance, a sweat-shop laborer´s experience 
of temporality is very different from that of a wealthy pensioner in a western country 
The experience of time is fundamentally different depending on the amounts of capital 
an agent possesses. There is no single temporality but rather an abundance of 
temporalities. Studying them requires knowledge of the historical situation in which 
175 PM, 13 
176 BT, 278 
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they have come about. The unfolding of time is dependent on the agent´s position on the 
social field.  
Bourdieu points out that Heidegger comes close to creating a historicist philosophy 
similar to his but does not go far enough. Heidegger will not take account of the insights 
that the social sciences can provide on the “genesis” of the cognitive subject : 
In giving an `ontological basis` to temporal experience, Heidegger is 
playing with fire, by coming close to creating a historicist vision of the 
transcendental ego, which would give a real role to history by taking into 
account the process of the empirical constitution of the cognitive subject 
(as analysed by the positive sciences) and of the constitutive role of time 
and historical process in the genesis of `essences`(those of geometry, for 
instance)- - 177 
Heidegger indeed does not take the step towards studying experience as a historical 
product, but this is hardly an accident. Kevin A. Aho points out, that Heidegger sees 
Dasein as a fundamental opening up of a space of meaning. This opening up precedes 
all concrete forms of historical kinds of experience and cannot be grasped by a science 
with a fixed ontology of possible entities: 
 It is only because I dwell in a space of meaning that I can come to 
 understand my embodied acts and practices for what they are. Third, the 
 body certainly gives us access to beings, but it does not constitute a 
 disclosive horizon that gives meaning to beings. Indeed, my body—like all 
 beings—makes sense to me only on the basis of an already opened 
 horizon.178   
Bourdieu´s historicism is different Heidegger´s, as he finds that Dasein is not the 
ahistorical space of meaning, but rather the field is. We should thus study the specific 
historical forms of experience that are structured by the social field. 
Bourdieu states in the interview for iichiko intercultural: 
177 PO, 63 
178 Aho 2009, 100 
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 Habitus had to very concretely mean – habitus, that which has been 
 acquired, from the verb habeo– that the principle of actions or 
 representations and the principle of constructing social reality that actions 
 and representations presuppose, is not a transcendental subject employing 
 universal categories (which is still the case in Heidegger, who inscribes 
 history into being without historicizing the “fundamental existentialia” 
 that function as transcendental conditions of the possibility of knowledge, 
 comprehension and language). 179   
Bourdieu criticizes the Heideggerian fundamental ontology for taking Dasein´s initial 
pre-ontological understanding of being as its only route to discovery, rather than also 
studying the historical and empirical constitution of Dasein. The truth about human 
being is found both inside everyday experience and outside it, in the social field which 
structures experience.  
Heidegger´s account of Dasein´s historicality as more basic than objective history does 
not convince Bourdieu. Bourdieu´s own historicism entails explaining the “genesis of 
essences”: he might accept the claim that even the existentialia change with history.  
The existentialia, Dasein´s structures, are cross-cultural and ahistorical in Heidegger, 
which from a Bourdieusian perspective is giving too much ahistorical content to human 
being. Although the structure of habitus as dispositions to act and represent can also be 
spelled out cross-culturally, Heidegger apparently goes too far with adding content to a 
description of human being. This is an obviously paradoxical position on Bourdieu´s 
part, as his own ontological accont of the social world is also universal to an extent. 
In conclusion, Bourdieu and Heidegger have similar accounts of practice and 
temporality, but they differ when it comes to sociality and history. Bourdieu´s account 
complements Heidegger by describing different experiences of temporality and practice 
and by rooting them to social background variables.  
Heidegger centres his account of practice on Dasein´s finite perspective, whereas 
Bourdieu keeps the social field in the picture as a wider perspective. They both see 
practice as human beings´ creative, mostly non-thetic acting in the world. Bourdieu´s 
179 EPTH, 8 (Translation: V.L.) 
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practice is social through and through and is thus dispersed into socio-historically 
conditioned practices. This is Bourdieu´s way of combining the empirical with the 
ontological: Study of historical structures reveals the types of practice and types of 
experience that unfold in different contexts.  
Early Heidegger´s ahistorical existentialia are put into question, because human being is 
radically determined by historically changing social conditions. The temporal aspect of 
practice is a primordial temporalizing in both Bourdieu and Heidegger, but Bourdieu 
finds empirically different temporalities that are determined by the social field. In 
Bourdieu´s view, the early Heideggerian temporalized space of meaning cannot be 
accounted for as pre-historical. Objective history ontologically precedes all events of 
temporalization.  
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6. CONCLUSION: THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOURDIEU 
AND EARLY HEIDEGGER 
6.1 Answers to the research questions 
This thesis began with three questions: 
 I. What are the philosophical similarities between Bourdieu and early 
 Heidegger? 
 II. What are the differences between them? 
 III. How is Bourdieu´s social ontology complementary in relation to 
 Heidegger? 
Answers to these questions have been provided throughout the previous chapters. These 
answers will now be briefly summed up: 
 
Answer to question I (What are the philosophical similarities between Bourdieu and 
early Heidegger?): 
I have shown that Bourdieu does not only build a regional ontology of the social world. 
His notion of practice shows how any access to beings requires a background of 
intelligibility that allows for beings to show up. I have explored Bourdieu´s thought as a 
version of fundamental ontology and shown that it is ontologically similar to 
Heideggerian fundamental ontology. Bourdieu not only provides an inventory of entities 
in the social world but provides an account of their intelligibility.  
Bourdieu and Heidegger share an understanding of the relevance of some non-
articulated background for action. Bourdieu refers to this background with terms like 
social field and doxa, Heidegger with terms like the world and the clearing. Bourdieu 
speaks explicitly against all theories of human action that take calculative rational action 
as the paradigm of human agency and a similar line of argument can be derived from 
Heidegger´s work. 
Heidegger and Bourdieu have similar thoughts on individuality and its relationship to 
other humans. Only through a shared background can individuals connect with each 
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other. Bourdieu goes as far as arguing that a specific kind of group habitus can lead to 
disadvantages in life that remain unnoticed due to too much emphasis placed on a 
misleading “individual responsibility”. They both view the “subject” as something other 
than an entity: it is always an involved activity in a practical context.   
Heidegger shows that individuality rarely comes to fore in everyday human life: the 
meanings that are necessary for the functioning of our everyday life are public, average 
interpretations that leave little room for authentic individuality. Bourdieu found 
Heidegger´s contempt for das Man´s average interpretations of being so scandalous that 
he did not pay attention to the important similarity between himself and Heidegger: the 
common world is the source of meaning in both thinkers, although Heidegger´s notion 
of public world differs significantly from Bourdieu´s social field. Heidegger emphasizes 
Dasein´s freedom to choose its destiny, be authentic and thus ignore the public world 
and its interpretations of being. Bourdieu then again finds freedom of choice a scarce 
resource and evokes social structures that are difficult to overcome.  
Bourdieu and the early Heidegger both introduce a large amount of concepts that refer 
to the relationship between the individual and the inter-subjective. They collapse 
dichotomies like internal – external, subject – object and self – world by bringing out 
the interconnectedness of humans and their shared world. We cannot become humans 
without the human world already being there as that which gives our experience its 
constitution.  
 
Answer to question II: (What are the differences between Bourdieu and early 
Heidegger?): 
Bourdieu directly contradicts Heidegger at many points. He argues that historical 
instantiations of human being cannot be reached only through existential 
phenomenology, but through an interplay between quantitative analysis, 
phenomenological hermeneutics and social theory. He sees temporality and practice as 
examples of phenomena that show themselves differently to people according to their 
social position. Any abstractions in relation to these notions need to be accompanied by 
empirical findings. Bourdieu does not see interpretation as the ultimate method of the 
social sciences. Interpretation is the starting point that can be then enriched with theory. 
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Bourdieu is critical of what he varyingly calls “phenomenology”, “subjectivism” or 
“idealism”. Bourdieu claims that no account of human being is complete without an 
explanation of the historico-cultural conditions of the possibility experience. Our 
current, even explicitly worked out ways of understanding cannot be absolutized as the 
final horizon of explanation unless they are backed with empirical observation and 
social theory.  
Bourdieu and Heidegger both find the temporality of practical dealings central and more 
original than universal “clock-time”. Heidegger sees the historicality and temporality of 
Dasein as a pre-condition of objective history. Both Bourdieu and Heidegger see 
temporal unfolding as human beings´ only access into the world. Bourdieu however 
argues that the combining of descriptive, hermeneutic accounts, quantitative analysis 
and objectifying theory can offer us a more fundamental understanding of reality than 
the universal structure of Dasein´s understanding of being. The history of the social 
field and the types of agency it produces are together the ontological basis of 
intelligibility for Bourdieu. 
Social practice as a co-production of the meaningful social world is the background of 
intelligibility in Bourdieu. He takes a further step by asserting that the historical flux of 
the social field ultimately also produces habitus, Dasein or any experiential opening. 
Thus the attention of social science should be turned also on history and its foundation 
cannot rely on the self-interpretation of Dasein. 
 
Answer to question III (How is Bourdieu´s social ontology complementary in relation to 
Heidegger?): 
Bourdieu has shown that Heidegger´s early philosophy can be used as a starting point 
for a new, unique account of agency and the social world. In that sense his thought has a 
complementary role in relation to early Heidegger. Bourdieu offers an empirical and 
theoretical account of the conditions of the possibility of consciousness and world, 
which notions are examined in Heidegger only from an ontological perspective. 
Bourdieu re-interprets the Heideggerian notion of world as a dynamic social field that 
consists of power relations. He also examines how the body is related to the social 
world. 
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Bourdieu´s starting point is meaningful human experience. Human being understood as 
a disclosing activity is what habitus essentially boils down to. What Bourdieu then does 
is list an array of social conditions that affect experience. He thus elaborated the 
Heideggerian analysis of human experience as Dasein by showing the conditions of its 
possibility. He also stresses that the current world is only a specific historical situation: 
habitus comes about through socialization and different situations lead to different 
habitus´. The global history of the social field ultimately explains the world we live in. 
Our world is only one instantiation of this ontological framework.  
 
6.2 Final remarks 
Pierre Bourdieu´s and the early Heidegger´s projects have a complex relationship and 
they seem like contradictory thinkers in many ways. However, on closer inspection it 
becomes clear that the two thinkers hold fundamental philosophical views that are 
similar. Bourdieu´s project also complements the early Heidegger in some ways. 
This thesis has been an attempt to bring out the “Heideggerian” in Bourdieu, to bring 
out known characteristics of Bourdieu´s thought from a new perspective. I have 
presented early Heidegger´s and Bourdieu´s thought separately and together. By going 
through relevant aspects of both thinkers I have done my best to bring together two 
conceptual worlds that initially seem far apart. Bourdieu, a left-wing empirical 
sociologist with an ambiguous relationship with philosophy, and early Heidegger, a 
conservative, in Bourdieu´s language, “pure philosopher”, are not an obvious match. 
I have gone through the role of Heidegger´s early philosophy in Bourdieu on several 
different levels. I began in chapter three by working out a comparison between two 
conceptual pairs: Dasein –  world and habitus – social field. I interpreted Bourdieu´s 
conceptual pair as a modified version of the Heideggerian pair. Bourdieu and Heidegger 
share a critical attitude specifically towards the Cartesian interpretation of the 
phenomenon of world. This critique is a common background for their views on the 
inter-connectedness of self and world. Bourdieu´s account of field as a social world 
differs from Heidegger: the field and its subfields are arenas of struggle over capital and 
positions attached to it whereas the Heideggerian world is only a shared background. 
Habitus is an embodied set of dispositions to act on a given field whereas Dasein is a 
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name of the entity that in its being takes a stand on its being on the basis of a shared 
world. Habitus is more explicitly something social and connected to positions of power 
on the field.   
I continued by examining the role of science, hermeneutics and phenomenology in 
Bourdieu and Heidegger. They both avoid relying on the transcendental subject in their 
thinking. Bourdieu´s criticisms of phenomenology are not aimed at Heidegger but rather 
the Husserlian account of phenomenology. The difference between them is that 
Bourdieu thinks that the empirical social sciences can provide further insight into an 
account of human being and the world and is not satisfied with a solely 
phenomenological interpretation of Dasein.  
In the same chapter I explored the role of historicity and human nature in Bourdieu and 
Heidegger. Bourdieu is explicitly against accounts of human nature and criticizes 
Heidegger´s existentialia for being ahistorical. Bourdieu´s own account of symbolic 
capital then again has been criticized by Dreyfus and Rabinow for implying a 
metaphysical view of human nature. I showed that Bourdieu´s theoretical framework in 
fact evokes an ontological, weak ahistorical account of human being. “Human nature” is 
however a too strong a word for describing this account. 
I went through the reasons for Bourdieu´s antipathy towards the Heideggerian account 
of das Man. Bourdieu is interested in revealing the power structures that are renewed in 
practice and das Man is the antithesis of individual resoluteness and responding to a 
unique situation. It almost entirely ignores the role of power in the public sphere. 
Bourdieu does not turn his attention to the positive role of das Man as the social source 
of intelligibility and the negative side of the public world in Heidegger is enough for 
Bourdieu to dismiss the entire conception of das Man.  
I showed that Bourdieu´s account of the role of practice and temporality in human 
existence has specific social conditions whereas Heidegger offers a more general 
description of practical dealings with things. This difference is in part due to Bourdieu´s 
notion of the historicity of scientific reason. Socio-economic factors make detaching 
oneself from practice possible and there are a variety of different social practices related 
to fields. Bourdieu´s account of temporality echoes that of Heidegger, but does not 
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settle for one, pure originary temporality. Instead, Bourdieu wants to relate temporality 
to socio-economic factors and history. 
My comparisons show the influence of Heidegger in Bourdieu but also that Bourdieu 
has embarked on completely new paths. He has not simply carried out empirical 
research based on Heideggerian ontology but instead has developed fundamental 
ontology further, specifically concentrating on the social world. 
The role of this thesis has been to bring to the fore the journey that Heidegger´s 
philosophy has travelled in Bourdieu´s hands and to trace back the Heideggerian aspects 
in Bourdieu´s thought. By doing this I have at the same time produced a description of 
Bourdieu´s social ontology.  
A further task would be to closer examine the different aspects that I have only touched 
upon in my comparisons. Also a closer inspection of Bourdieu´s empirical works would 
shed light on the dialectical role Bourdieu sees between empirical research and 
ontology. This would help to further differentiate Bourdieu´s thought from Heidegger´s 
early philosophy, as this thesis concentrates on a general, unifying outline. Bourdieu´s 
scattered remarks on Heidegger now appear as more coherent on the basis of this 
unifying account of the role of Heidegger´s thought in Bourdieu. I wish that my thesis 
offers a vantage point from which Bourdieu´s thought can be better understood, both 
individually and in relation to Heidegger.  
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